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Abstract
This paper solves for the set of equilibrium payoffs in bargaining with interdependent
values when the informed party makes all offers, as discounting vanishes. The seller of a
good is informed of its quality, which affects both his cost and the buyer’s valuation, but the
buyer is not. To characterize this payoff set, we derive an upper bound, using mechanism
design with limited commitment. We then prove that this upper bound is tight, by showing
that all its extreme points are equilibrium payoffs. Our results shed light on the role of
different forms of commitment on the bargaining process. In particular, we show that it
is the buyer’s inability to commit to a contract before observing the terms of trade that
precludes efficiency.
Keywords: bargaining, mechanism design, market for lemons.
JEL codes: C70, C78, D82
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Introduction
With few exceptions, non-cooperative theories of bargaining concern themselves with the

extreme cases of full commitment or no commitment whatsoever. Mechanism design neglects
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the problem of credibility, whereas infinite-horizon bargaining following Rubinstein (1982) revels
in the asymptotic study of the equilibrium outcome as frictions, interpreted as commitment
power, disappear.
Plainly, the context of most actual exchanges lies somewhere between these theoretical benchmarks. Caveat emptor rarely applies, nor does unrestrained consumer protection.1 Lack of
information, for instance, is often raised by courts as an argument for calling a contract unconscionable. To be sure, the onus is on the buyer to exercise due diligence when evaluating whether
a good is worth the purchase price. But a contract that would ask for the buyer to commit to it
before knowing whether and what price trade will take place, for instance, would be difficult to
judicially enforce. As Gresik (1991a) has pointed out, buyers can rarely be coerced into accepting
offers that make them worse off.2 Yet this is one of the main prescription of mechanism design.
Our goal is to understand whether and how commitment matters. To do so, we consider a
standard model of trade, with one buyer and one seller. The setting is that of the lemon problem,
as introduced by Akerlof (1970), the simplest framework for trade under interdependent values,
an essential feature for the discussion. The seller knows both the value and cost of the unit,
while the buyer does not.3 There is common knowledge of gains from trade.
The full commitment problem has been throughly investigated by Samuelson (1984) and
Myerson (1985), and their findings provide the starting point for our analysis. As already pointed
out by Myerson (1981), optimal mechanisms with interdependent values can exhibit surprising
properties. In particular, in our problem, the optimal mechanism need not satisfy posterior
individual rationality. That is, the buyer may lose from participating in the mechanism given
the information that this mechanism reveals: if the buyer were to reconsider his willingness1

The inadequacy of theoretical analysis for contract law has been denounced by Posner (2002), for instance.
However, there are important exceptions to this neglect, from Schelling (1956) to Williamson (1983).
2
Entry fees are an important exception, as they are sunk. Entry fees are rarely allowed in bargaining games
–the focus of our paper. This is not to say that entry fees are irrelevant in practice. On the contrary, our analysis
delineates the potential role of such fees.
3
By a simple change of variable, all our results apply to the case in which it is the buyer who is informed and
who makes offers, and the seller is uninformed.
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to-trade in light of the offer that he is supposed to accept, given that this offer leads him to
re-evaluate his expected value for the unit, he may very well prefer to pass.
Giving such veto power to the buyer is the second step in our analysis. Note that this is not
equivalent to ex post individual rationality, a stronger requirement that posits that the buyer
gains given the actual state of nature. The difference matters here, since values are interdependent (see Gresik 1991b, Forges 1994 and Matthews and Postlewaite 1989). This property,
which we refer to as veto-incentive compatibility, following Forges (1999), imposes restrictions on
the mapping from reported types to the distribution over offers that the mechanism specifies.
Veto-incentive compatibility, then, is a requirement on the graph of this map: conditional on
any given offer, the posterior belief of the buyer should be such that he is willing to accept this
offer. As one immediately suspects, restricting attention to deterministic offers would entail a
loss of generality. This does not mean that the buyer accepts a random price; rather, the price
he accepts has been chosen randomly.
Veto-incentive compatibility is not only a restriction on mechanisms that is realistic, given
current legal and commercial practices, it is also implied by standard bargaining protocols. We
prove, in particular, that it is automatically satisfied whenever at most one of the players –buyer
or seller– makes an offer per round, whether or not this order is pre-determined, stochastic,
history-dependent, etc., and whether the horizon is finite or not.
We characterize veto-incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we show that, if there are
finitely many types (an assumption our model does not impose), it is enough to consider as
many offers as types. Moreover, the k-th highest offer can only come the k-th highest or higher
seller’s types.4 More importantly, we show that whether a given allocation can be implemented in
a veto-incentive compatible way or not is a property of (the map from reports to) the probability
of trade and expected price alone. The problem reduces then to a standard optimal control
problem, to which variational techniques can be applied. The interesting feature is the property
4

This result is reminiscent of Bester and Strausz (2001), although our environment does not fit their model.
First, we have a continuum of types. Second, we are not in their single-agent environment.
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imposed by veto-incentive compatibility: the necessary and sufficient condition is that the buyer’s
ex ante payoff, conditional on trading with all types above a given threshold be nonnegative, for
all possible values of this threshold.
Our last step is the case that is usually associated with complete lack of commitment. This
is the infinite-horizon bargaining game. We focus on the case in which the seller makes all the
offers. Clearly, the resulting outcome must satisfy veto-incentive compatibility, since the buyer
can reject any given offer. Clearly also, the temporal monopoly of the seller provides him with
a lower bound on his payoff, no matter how patient players are. More precisely, his lowest type
can still secure a price equal to the buyer’s lowest possible cost. We prove that, along with vetoincentive compatibility, this is the only further constraint imposed by bargaining: every payoff
vector that can be achieved by a veto-incentive compatible allocation and that gives the seller
this security payoff is an equilibrium payoff vector if the two players are patient enough. This
might sound like a folk theorem, but this only holds in terms of payoffs: there are allocations
that are veto-incentive compatible, and give the seller his security payoff, and yet cannot be
implemented in the bargaining game.
Our results have striking implications. First, under the sufficient conditions we provide
(roughly, high gains from trade or low information rents) bargaining achieves constrained efficiency. In those circumstances, commitment has no benefits whatsoever. Second, if bargaining
fails to attain efficiency, then trading institutions are only useful for efficiency if they manage
to weaken the veto-incentive compatibility constraint, as is the case, for instance, when the
uninformed party is asked to commit to a screening contract. Nothing in between helps.
From a practical point of view, these results imply that, within the context of the lemons
problem, the theoretical predictions we (or others) obtain for these three cases (commitment,
veto-incentive compatibility and no commitment) carry over to institutions with commitment
that is in between.
However, our result is only about ex ante payoffs: Sequential rationality imposes further
4

constraints in bargaining, since for instance, both the seller’s and the buyer’s payoffs must be
individually rational, not only from the ex ante point of view, but from any history onward. As
we show, there are allocations that are veto-incentive compatible and give the seller his security
payoff, and yet cannot be implemented in the bargaining game. Furthermore, this “folk” theorem
does not extend to interim payoffs, and might not even include the equilibrium payoff of the game
in which the buyer makes all the offers (Deneckere and Liang, 2006). Somewhat surprisingly,
these other constraints do not affect the set of ex ante payoffs.
With respect to the bargaining literature, together with Deneckere and Liang’s, this paper
clarifies the role of the proposer’s identity. For instance, the most efficient equilibrium outcome
when the seller makes all the offers is strictly more efficient than the equilibrium outcome when
the buyer makes the offers. Sometimes, even the most inefficient equilibrium does better.
Among related papers, Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) analyze the link between mechanism
design and bargaining in the special case of private values (with one-sided incomplete information). They show that, when the uninformed party makes all the offers, a folk theorem holds.
That is, every incentive compatible, individually rational, direct bargaining mechanism is implementable by sequential equilibria, if the frequency of offers is high enough. On the other hand,
if the informed party makes the offer, a unique equilibrium outcome gets singled out as the frequency of offers increases. Our paper establishes that, as one would suspect, lack of commitment
imposes more constraints with interdependent values than with private values. Interestingly
though, the set of equilibrium payoffs that can be achieved remains fairly easy to characterize,
as the feasible set of some programming problem. The paper by Deneckere and Liang that was
already mentioned provides a careful analysis of the bargaining game in which the (uninformed)
buyer makes all the offers, and they prove that the equilibrium outcome is then unique. We
comment further on the relationship with Deneckere and Liang as we proceed.
Section 2 defines the set-up. The main results are in Section 3, with a sketch of proof provided
in Section 4. (The full proof is available in an online appendix.) Section 5 offers extensions.
5

2

The Set-Up

2.1

The Trading Problem

Consider a trading problem in which player 1, the seller, owns an indivisible object that
player 2, the buyer, wants to purchase. The two players are risk-neutral, with quasi-linear utility.
The players’ valuations are determined by the realization of a random variable that is uniformly
distributed over the unit interval, t ∼ U[0, 1]. That is, given t, the seller’s cost and the buyer’s
value for the object are given by c(t) and v(t) respectively. The functions c : [0, 1] → R+ and
v : [0, 1] → R+ are assumed to be non-decreasing and piecewise continuously C 1 . We also
assume that c is piecewise C 1 on (0, 1). Because v need not be constant, this environment
displays interdependent values, of which private values is a special case. The assumption that t
is uniformly distributed is made with no loss of generality, given the restrictions imposed on v
and c.5
Information is asymmetric. The seller is informed of the realization of the random variable,
and so knows both his cost and the buyer’s value. We refer to this realization as the seller’s type
t ∈ T := [0, 1]. The buyer, on the other hand, does not observe this realization. However, he
knows the distribution of the random variable, and the functions v and c are common knowledge.
In particular, it is common knowledge that there are gains from trade. That is, we assume
that v(t) > c(t).6 This neither precludes nor implies that the first-best allocation is attainable
if individual rationality is imposed. Such a first-best mechanism is individually rational if and
only if the buyer’s expected value exceeds the seller’s highest cost (see Lemma 1 of Deneckere
and Liang, 2006). While our results can be adapted to this case, the trading problem becomes
5

In an online appendix (Appendix C), we discuss what happens when c and v are not both monotonic.
Sufficiency from Proposition 1 survives, and simple necessary and sufficient conditions are provided under which
the ex ante efficient payoff in the full commitment is an equilibrium payoff under bargaining as frictions vanish.
6
The main results –Theorem 1, Proposition 1, Proposition 2, Theorems 2 and 3– also hold under the weaker
condition v ≥ c, as long as there are finitely many types. Our proofs involve a series of approximation of the cost
and value functions by step functions, and we have not verified that the limit results extend to the case of a weak
inequality.
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then uninteresting, and we will rule it out.
Our purpose is to characterize the equilibrium payoffs in the bargaining game in which the
seller makes all offers. To do so, we must understand what allocations can be achieved under
limited commitment. First, we shall consider the case in which the buyer cannot be forced to
trade if the actual offer that is being made leads to a negative expected payoff. Following Forges
(1999), we refer to this assumption as veto-incentive compatibility. Given the mechanism, and
for any outstanding offer, the buyer updates his expected value for the object. Veto-incentive
compatibility requires this conditional expectation to exceed the offer, whenever the mechanism
specifies trade in this event. This captures the notion that, in most trading environments, buyers
can always reject an offer for which they anticipate a loss. In the words of Gresik (1991a), “in
most markets each trader has the ability to refuse to trade when the “best” negotiated terms give
him negative utility.” For instance, a seller who puts up an object for sale in an auction house
commits to the eventual outcome, given the auction mechanism, but potential buyers can drop
out at any stage of the auction process. Note that, with interdependent values, this does not
ensure that the buyer will not experience regret, that is, that his realized value will exceed the
price that he paid. In many markets, there is not much a buyer can do to renege on a purchase
for which his experienced utility falls short of the price that he paid. In this sense, the trade need
not be ex post individually rational. (The two notions coincide in the case of private values.) At
the time of purchase, however, the potential buyer cannot be forced to accept an outstanding
offer, if he anticipates a loss, simply because he chose to participate in the trading process.
The set of payoffs that can be achieved under this mechanism (as well as under the standard
“full-commitment” mechanism) will then be compared to the set of payoffs in the infinite-horizon
bargaining game with discounting, in which the seller makes all the offers.
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2.2

Mechanisms

Direct mechanisms, that require the seller to report his type, provide a way for setting the
terms of trade. To be more formal, a direct mechanism is a probability transition µ from T
to {0, 1} × R+ .7,8 A direct mechanism, then, specifies whether trade occurs (the outcome “1”
is interpreted as trade, while the outcome “0” means no trade), and at what price, according
to some joint distribution, and given the announcement of the seller. We let x(t) denote the
probability of trade, given the announcement t. That is,
x(t) := µ(t)[1, R+ ].

(1)

Without loss of generality, we assume that no payment is made if no trade occurs, that is, we
assume that µ(t)[0, {0}] = 1 − x(t). If x(t) > 0, we let p(t) denote the expected price, given the
announcement t, i.e.
p(t) :=

Z

pµ(t)[1, dp]/x(t),

(2)

R+

and set p(t) := 0 otherwise. Given x : T → [0, 1] and p : T → R+ , the allocation (x, p)
is implementable if there exists a mechanism µ (which implements (x, p)) such that x and p
coincide everywhere with the functions that are defined by (1) and (2).
It follows from the revelation principle that attention can be restricted to direct mechanisms
in which the seller announces his type truthfully. Furthermore, under commitment, attention can
be restricted to mechanisms in which prices are deterministic, i.e. p(t) is the only price assigned
positive probability by µ(t)[1, ·], for all t.
Given some direct mechanism µ, the payoff to the seller of type t that reports s is given by
π S (s | t) := x(s)[p(s) − c(t)].
7

That is, for each t ∈ T , µ(t) is a probability distribution on {0, 1}×R+, and the probability µ(·)[A] assigned to
any Borel set A ⊂ {0, 1} × R+ is a measurable function of t ∈ T . That attention can be restricted to distributions
over the probability of trade and payment is a consequence of the revelation principle.
8
It is not hard to see that the restriction to offers in R+ rather than R is without loss of generality for those
allocations, and hence payoffs, that we seek to characterize.
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The mechanism µ is incentive compatible if, for all s, t ∈ T , π S (t) := π S (t | t) ≥ π S (s | t). We
shall also be interested in the ex ante payoff of the seller before his type is determined, that is,
given some incentive compatible mechanism µ,
S

S

π = Et [π (t)] =

Z

S

π (t)dt =
T

Z

x(t)[p(t) − c(t)]dt.

(3)

T

Fix some incentive compatible mechanism µ. Suppose that the buyer is offered to trade at some
price p in the support of µ(t)[1, ·] for some t ∈ T . What is his expected payoff, conditional
on this outcome (1, p)? Given the mechanism µ, fix a version of the conditional distribution
ν : ({0, 1} × R+ ) × B → [0, 1], where B is the Borel field on T . Given T ∈ B, we write ν(T | p)
for ν((1, p), T ) , the conditional probability assigned to the seller’s type being in the set T , given
the event (1, p) (with an abuse of notation, we also write ν(t | p) for ν({t} | p)). The buyer’s
expected payoff, given p, is then
B

π (p) :=

Z

v(t)dν(t | p) − p.

T

The ex ante payoff of the buyer is given by
B

π :=

Z

x(t)[v(t) − p(t)]dt.

(4)

T

An incentive compatible mechanism µ is individually rational if π S (t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T , and
π B ≥ 0. Further, it is veto-incentive compatible if πB (p) ≥ 0 for all prices in the support of
µ. Because the buyer must break even given his conditional expectation, there is a priori no
reason to expect that it is sufficient to consider mechanisms that specify deterministic prices,
when considering veto-incentive compatible mechanisms.
To summarize, we shall be interested in determining the allocations (x, p) that can be implemented by incentive compatible, individually rational and veto-incentive compatible mechanisms,
and in the set of ex ante payoffs π = (π B , πS ) spanned by such allocations.9 For short, we refer
9

A set of allocations {(x, p)} spans the payoff set A ⊂ R2 if the image of that set, by the mappings defined

9

to this problem as the veto-incentive compatible program, and these allocations as the vetoincentive compatible allocations, to be compared with the full commitment allocations, in which
the requirement of veto-incentive compatibility is dropped. The problem of determining the
latter set is known (see, in particular, Samuelson 1984, and Myerson 1985), and is referred to in
the sequel as the full commitment program.
Of particular interest is the (constrained) efficient allocation for each program, that is, any
R
allocation (x, p) that maximizes the overall gains from trade T x(t)[v(t)−c(t)]dt, or equivalently,

that maximizes the sum of ex ante payoffs π S + πB .

2.3

The Bargaining Game

In Section 3.3, we shall finally consider the infinite-horizon bargaining game. Trivially, this
further reduces the set of implementable allocations. Deneckere and Liang (2006) have provided
a comprehensive analysis of the game in which the uninformed party, the buyer, makes all the
offers. Doing so allows to abstract from signaling issues, since after any history there is only
one action that the informed party can take that does not terminate the game. Therefore, the
analysis becomes tractable, although far from trivial, and the equilibrium outcome turns out to
be unique. We shall consider the opposite case, in which the seller makes all the offers, and show
that, in this case as well, it is possible to provide a simple characterization of the equilibrium
payoffs as bargaining frictions vanish. Furthermore, the best equilibrium improves upon the
equilibrium in the game in which the buyer makes the offers (in terms of efficiency).
Let us define the game formally. Time is discrete, and indexed by n = 1, . . . , ∞. At each
time or period n, the seller asks a price for the unit. After observing the price, the buyer either
accepts or rejects it. If the price is accepted, the game ends. If the offer is rejected, a period
elapses and the seller asks for a price again. We shall allow for a public randomization device
in the initial period (for concreteness, think of a draw from the uniform distribution on the unit
by (3 ) and (4), is equal to A.
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interval), before the seller sets the first price. This allows us to focus on the extreme points of
the equilibrium payoff set, and we shall not refer to this randomization device in the sequel.
The seller’s asking price can take any real value. An outcome of the game is a triple (t, n, pn ),
with the interpretation that the realized type is t, and that the buyer accepts the seller’s price pn
in period n (which implies that all previous prices were rejected). The case n = ∞ corresponds
to the outcome in which the buyer rejects all the prices (as a convention, set p∞ equal to 0).
Buyer and seller discount future payoffs at the common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). The seller’s
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function over outcomes is his net surplus δ n−1 (pn − c(t)) when
n < ∞, and zero otherwise. This suggests the interpretation of the cost as an actual production
cost incurred at the time of the transaction, but an alternative and equivalent formulation is that
the seller derives a flow utility of (1 − δ)c(t) in every period in which he holds on to the unit.
The buyer’s utility is δ n−1 (v(t) − pn ) when the outcome is (t, n, pn ), n < ∞, and 0 if n = ∞.10
The players’ expected utilities over lotteries of outcomes, or payoffs, are defined as usual.
A history (of prices) hn−1 ∈ H n−1 in case trade has not occurred by time n is a sequence
(p1 , . . . , pn−1 ) of asking prices that the seller set and the buyer rejected (set H0 := ∅). A behavior
strategy σ S for the seller is a sequence {σ Sn }, where σ Sn is a probability transition from T × H n−1
into R, mapping the seller’s type, the history hn−1 into a (possibly random) asking price. A
B
behavior strategy σ B for the buyer is a sequence {σ B
n }, where σ n is a probability transition from

H n−1 × R into {0, 1}, mapping the history hn−1 and the outstanding price into a probability of
acceptance (as before, “1” denotes acceptance, and “0” rejection). We use the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) concept as defined in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Definition 8.2).11 Given
some (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium, we follow standard terminology in calling a seller’s offer
serious if it is accepted by the buyer with positive probability. An offer is losing if it is not
serious. Clearly, the specification of losing offers in an equilibrium is, to a large extent, arbitrary.
10

Discounting plays no role for optimality. Results carry over to a sequence of short-run buyers, as long as the
buyer’s payoff is interpreted as the discounted sum of these short-run buyers’ payoffs.
11
Fudenberg and Tirole define perfect Bayesian equilibria for finite games of incomplete information only. The
suitable generalization of their definition to infinite games is straightforward and omitted.
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Given some equilibrium σ = (σ B , σS ), we denote by π S (σ) and π B (σ) the ex ante payoff of
the seller and the buyer, respectively. Note that this involves taking expectations with respect
to the seller’s type. Given δ, the payoff vector π = (π B , πS ) can be achieved in the bargaining
game if there exists an equilibrium σ of the bargaining game such that π = (π B (σ), π S (σ)).
Let E(δ) denote the set of equilibria in the bargaining game with discount factor δ, and
Π(δ) ⊂ R2 the set of payoff vectors given δ. Further, define Π := lim inf δ→1 Π(δ) and Π :=
lim supδ→1 Π(δ) as the inner and outer limits of the equilibrium payoff set as frictions vanish. We
shall show that those two sets are equal, and provide a simple characterization of this set.

3

Main Results

3.1

Preliminaries: The Full Commitment Program

We start by recalling the characterizations obtained by Samuelson (1984) and Myerson (1985)
for the set of ex ante payoffs that can be achieved through mechanisms that satisfy incentive
compatibility and individual rationality.
For later purposes, it is useful to define the following. Given a mechanism µ, define the
expected payment p̄(t) received by type t ∈ T as
p̄(t) := x(t)p(t).
Note that specifying the function p̄ : T → [0, 1] is equivalent to specifying the function p, given
our convention that p(t) = 0 whenever x(t) = 0. Incentive compatibility is the requirement that
π S (t) = p̄(t) − x(t)c(t) ≥ p̄(s) − x(s)c(t),
for all s, t ∈ T . This implies, in particular, that
π S (t) ≥ lim π S (s | t),
s↓t

12

for all t ∈ T . We refer to these constraints as the set of local incentive compatibility constraints.
Suppose that the local incentive compatibility constraints are binding for all t ∈ T .12 It is
then standard to show that π S has bounded variation and equal to, for all t,
S

S

π (t) = π (1) +

Z

13

1

x(s)dc(s).

t

In this case, all expected payments are uniquely determined by the probabilities of trade (and
the price p̄(1)) through
p̄(t) = p̄(1) − x(1)c(1) + x(t)c(t) +

Z

1

x(s)dc(s).
t

Let us also define the buyer’s payoff B(t) accruing from all seller’s types above t, given some
allocation (x, p), as
B(t) :=

Z

1

(x(s)v(s) − p̄(s))ds.

(5)

t

Note that B(0) = π B . Further, if all local incentive compatibility constraints are binding, we can
express B(t) as a function of x (and p̄(1)) only. Explicitly,
Z

1

Z

1

[x(s)v(s) − (p̄(1) − x(1)c(1) + x(s)c(s) +
x(u)dc(u))]ds
t
s
Z 1
Z 1
=
[x(s)(v(s) − c(s)) −
x(u)dc(u)]ds − (1 − t)(p̄(1) − x(1)c(1)).

B(t) =

t

s

Trivially, given the revelation principle, the set of implementable allocations in the full commitment program is characterized by incentive compatibility and individual rationality. A sharper
characterization can be obtained for the set of achievable payoff vectors.
Theorem 1 (Samuelson 1984, Myerson 1985)14 Assume c(1) ≥
12

R

T

v(t)dt. Under full commit-

Because the cost function need not be continuous, there are allocations that are implementable in the full
commitment program for which Rsome local incentive
compatibility P
constraints are not binding.
R
13
Here and in what follows, T x(s)dc(s) := (0,1) x(t)c′ (t)dt + t∈Dc x(t)(c(t) − lims↑t c(s)), where c′ is the
derivative of c on each interval, Dc is the set of discontinuities of c, and x is assumed to be right-continuous (since
c and v are, this is without loss of generality). Later references to derivatives have to be understood similarly.
14
More precisely, Samuelson (1984, unnumbered lemma) shows that the Pareto-efficient allocations are achieved
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ment:
1. The payoff set can be obtained, without loss of generality, by assuming that all local incentive
compatibility constraints bind, and that the highest seller type’s payoff is zero: π S (1) = 0;
2. The payoff set is spanned by the set of non-increasing functions x : T → [0, 1] subject to
Z

1

[x(s)(v(s) − c(s)) −

0

Z

1

x(u)dc(u)]ds ≥ 0,

s

given expected payments, for all t ∈ T ,
p̄(t) = x(t)c(t) +

Z

1

x(s)dc(s).
t

3. The payoff set is a convex polygon whose extreme points are achieved by functions x : T →
[0, 1] that are step functions with either two or three steps; the origin is an extreme point,
and for all other extreme points, it can be assumed that x(0) = 1.
The constraint in the second part of the theorem is simply the requirement that B(0) ≥ 0,
given the definition of p̄. The requirement that x be non-increasing ensures incentive compatibility, given the definition of p̄. Theorem 1.2 states that any non-increasing function x ∈ [0, 1]
satisfying B(0) ≥ 0 (a constraint that only involves x) is part of an allocation that is implementable in the full commitment program, along with the expected payments defined in the
theorem, and that these allocations are a sufficient class to generate all the payoffs that can be
achieved in this program. As mentioned, one mechanism implementing any such allocation is a
mechanism with deterministic prices. There are other mechanisms implementing this allocation,
and other allocations that are implementable, but they do not lead to any extra payoff vectors.
In light of this characterization, the payoff set of the full commitment program can be obtained
by considering a family of continuous linear programs, in which one maximizes λ·π over functions
x satisfying the constraints given in Theorem 1.2, where λ ∈ R2 are the (possibly negative)
by two- or three-step functions. Parts 1–2 follows from Myerson’s analysis (although all conclusions are rather
straightforward given Samuelson’s result).
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weights on the buyer and seller’s payoffs. The maxima of these programs determine the extreme
points of the payoff set, and it is then a standard result that such extreme points are themselves
achieved by extreme points of the admissible set, i.e., by step functions.
The (constrained) efficient allocation takes a simple form, given that it solves a maximization
problem in which the objective and the constraint are linear. As Samuelson and Myerson show,
the ex ante efficient mechanism is as follows:






x (t) =






there exist 0 < t1 ≤ t2 ≤ 1 such that:
1 t ∈ [0, t1 ) ,
x t ∈ [t1 , t2 ] ,
0 t > t2 ,

where


t1 v0t1 − c (t1 )
,
x :=
t2 c (t2 ) − (t2 − t1 ) vtt12 − t1 c (t1 )

(6)

and v0t1 , vtt12 are the conditional expectations of the buyer’s value over the relevant intervals,
namely
v0t1

1
:=
t1

Z

t1

v (t) dt,
0

1
:=
t2 − t1

vtt12

Z

t2

v (t) dt.

t1

As can be verified, the threshold t1 (resp., t2 ) minimizes (resp., maximizes) the ratio
R t2
(v(t) − c(t))dt
t1
,
R t2
′ (t)dt
tc
t1

given t2 (resp., t1 ). The numerator measures the gains from trade with the types in the interval
[t1 , t2 ], while the denominator measures the information rents of the seller’s types in that interval.15 Indeed, if the buyer were to trade with, and only with, the seller’s types [0, t], his expected
gains would be at most
Y (t) :=

Z

0

t

(v(s) − c(t))ds =

Z

t

(v(s) − c(s) − sc′ (s))ds,

(7)

0

Rt
To see this, note that, from the formula for Y given by (7), t12 sc′ (s)ds is the difference between the gains
from trade and the buyer’s additional profit accruing from the types [t1 , t2 ).
15

15

a function that plays an important role in Samuelson and Myerson’s analysis, as in ours.

3.2

The Veto-Incentive Compatible Program

Recall that the veto-incentive compatible program is obtained by adding to the full commitment program the requirement that, for any outstanding offer, the buyer’s payoff is always
non-negative, conditional on the outstanding offer, given his updated beliefs. At first sight, these
constraints appear rather intractable, since these are restrictions on the marginal distributions
over offers derived from the joint distribution over types and offers that a mechanism defines.
The main result of this subsection establishes that, in fact, these constraints can be formulated
in terms of the probabilities of trade alone. Therefore, as in the full commitment problem, it is
enough to consider functions x, rather than distributions defined by µ, to determine the payoff
set, so that standard variational techniques can be applied.
We first characterize implementable allocations, and then achievable payoffs. The following
proposition, proved in Section 4, characterizes the set of allocations that can be implemented
in the veto-incentive compatible program. Recall that incentive compatibility and individual
rationality are minimal requirements.
Proposition 1 An incentive compatible, individually rational allocation (x, p) is implementable
in the veto-incentive compatible program if and only if, for all t ∈ T ,
B(t) =

Z

1

x(s)[v(s) − p(s)]ds ≥ 0.

t

Equipped with Proposition 1, it is then straightforward to characterize the set of payoffs that
can be achieved in the veto-incentive compatible program.
Theorem 2 Suppose that c(1) ≥

R

T

v(t)dt. In the veto-incentive compatible program:

1. The payoff set can be obtained, without loss of generality, by assuming that all local incentive
compatibility constraints bind, and that the highest seller type’s payoff is zero: π S (1) = 0;
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2. The payoff set is spanned by the set of non-increasing functions x : T → [0, 1] subject to,
for all t ∈ T ,
Z

1

[x(s)(v(s) − c(s)) −

t

Z

1

x(u)dc(u)]ds ≥ 0,

(8)

s

given expected payments, for all t ∈ T ,
p̄(t) = x(t)c(t) +

Z

1

x(s)dc(s).
t

Note that the constraint in the second part of the theorem is simply the requirement that
B(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T , given the definition of p̄. Theorem 2.2 states that any non-increasing
function x ∈ [0, 1] satisfying B(t) ≥ 0 for all t (a constraint that only involves the function x) is
part of an allocation that is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program, along with
the expected payments defined in the theorem, and that these allocations are a sufficient class
to generate all the payoffs that can be achieved in this program. Because of the veto-incentive
compatibility constraint, the mechanism that is constructed in the proof of this theorem is not,
however, a mechanism with deterministic prices.
The constraints B(t) ≥ 0 (as stated in Theorem 2.2 in terms of the probabilities x(t) only)
are linear (in x) as well. It follows that the payoff set can be once again determined by using
continuous linear programming. There is, however, one difficulty that is common to incentive
problems with hidden characteristics and a continuum of types, namely the requirement that the
function x be non-increasing. Fortunately, tools exist for such constraints. See, in particular,
Hellwig (2009). What is the structure of the solution for boundary points of the payoff set? It
depends, of course, on the specific boundary point and the underlying functions c and v. Note
that, by differentiating twice (8), we obtain that the probability x must satisfy the ordinary
differential equation
x′ (t)(v(t) − c(t)) + x(t)v ′ (t) = 0
on any such interval. The problem then reduces to identifying this finite partition. Indeed,
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examples can be constructed for which B is identically zero over some interval, and therefore,
the allocation need not be a step function, nor the payoff set a convex polygon (the set of extreme
points need not be finite).
It is an easy consequence of this theorem that the payoff vector maximizing the buyer’s payoff
in the veto-incentive compatible program coincides with the payoff vector that maximizes the
buyer’s payoff in the full commitment program.16 The seller’s highest payoff is either equal to,
or smaller than the corresponding payoff in the full commitment program. Sufficient conditions
for equality will be provided in the next section.

3.3

Bargaining Game

We finally consider the bargaining game. Clearly, for any history, given any outstanding
offer that is accepted with positive probability, sequential rationality requires that the buyer’s
conditional payoff from accepting it must be non-negative. Therefore, the ex ante payoffs that can
be achieved via bargaining must form a subset of the payoff set of the veto-incentive compatible
program. But bargaining imposes additional constraints. For instance, since v is non-decreasing,
it is common knowledge that the object is worth at least v(0) to the buyer. Therefore, the
seller of type t can secure a payoff of v(0) − c(t), since he can always insist on such an offer.
(The formal argument is standard and omitted. See, for instance, Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole
(1985), Lemma 2, which establishes that no lower offer is ever submitted in equilibrium, so that
any such offer is necessarily accepted.) It is worth pointing out here that, if (x, p) is incentive
compatible, then π S (0) ≥ v(0) − c(0) implies that π S (t) ≥ v(0) − c(t) for all t ≥ 0, so that the
aforementioned requirement reduces to π S (0) ≥ v(0) − c(0). Since this provides a lower bound
on the seller’s payoff, we may think of this as the seller’s reservation payoff in the bargaining
game, a strengthening of individual rationality. Note that the most efficient mechanism in the
16

In fact, this follows from Proposition 1 in Samuelson (1984), as he shows that the buyer’s favorite outcome
is a take-it-or-leave it offer, so that veto-incentive compatibility does not bind at this allocation.
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veto IC program automatically satisfies the reservation payoff constraint.
One might wonder whether bargaining imposes additional restrictions on achievable payoffs.
The main result of this section states that this is not the case, at least when δ → 1. Before
stating this result, note that, with any equilibrium σ and for each type t, one can associate a
quantity x(t), namely the discounted total probability with which trade occurs under σ given t,
#
"
X
x(t) = Eσ
δ n−1 1σBn (hn−1 ,pn)=1 ,
n

where 1A is the indicator function of the event A. Similarly, given some equilibrium σ, we
let p̄(t) ∈ R denote the expected discounted payment received by type t in this equilibrium.
References to local incentive compatibility, or individual rationality, can be understood in terms
of the pair (x, p̄). Recall that Π := lim inf δ→1 Π(δ) and Π := lim supδ→1 Π(δ).
Theorem 3 Suppose that c(1) ≥

R

T

v(t)dt. Then Π = Π =: Π. Further, this set of payoff is

equal to the set of payoffs that can be achieved by veto-incentive compatible allocations for which
π S (0) ≥ v(0) − c(0).
This result establishes that the only additional constraint on payoffs imposed by the bargaining game is that the lowest seller’s type must secure his reservation payoff. In terms of efficiency,
for instance, this theorem implies that there is no difference between the best outcome under
bargaining and in the best veto incentive compatible mechanism.
However, it is not true that any individually rational, incentive compatible allocation satisfying veto-incentive compatibility, and giving the lowest seller’s type his reservation payoff can
be necessarily implemented in the bargaining game. In Section 5.3, we provide an example of
such an allocation, and explain why it cannot be implemented. For any such allocation, our
result implies that there exists a payoff-equivalent allocation (in terms of ex ante payoffs for
the seller and the buyer) that can be implemented. Therefore, bargaining imposes restrictions
on implementable allocations that go beyond veto-incentive compatibility (and the restriction
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imposed by the security payoff), but not on payoffs.
Which constraints bind depends on the vertex of the set Π that is considered. On the
upper boundary of this set, it can be assumed, without loss of generality, that all local incentive
compatibility constraints are binding, and that the highest type’s payoff of the seller trading with
positive probability is zero: π S (1) = 0; on the other hand, for those vertices that minimize some
convex combination of the seller’s and buyer’s payoff, the incentive compatibility constraints bind
“downward,” that is, for all t ∈ T ,
πS (t) = lim π S (s | t),
s↑t

with the boundary condition that the trading price of the highest seller’s type t is given by the
minimum of v(t) and either lims↓t c(s), t < 1, or c(1) if t = 1.
Given that the bargaining game imposes only one additional linear constraint to the vetoincentive compatible program, it can be analyzed via linear programming as well. Depending
on c and v, this additional constraint can create a discontinuity (i.e., a step) in the function x
which has no counterpart in the previous (veto-incentive compatible) program, and arises before
the first binding constraint B(t) = 0. Notice also that the constraint that π S (0) ≥ v(0) − c(0)
implies that the seller secures the ex ante payoff E[[v(0) − c(t)]+ ] (because, as already mentioned,
it implies that π S (t) ≥ v(0) − c(t) for all t). However, the two requirements are not equivalent,
as the example in the next subsection illustrates.
The proof of Theorem 3 is sketched in the next section. In doing so, we show that the payoff
vector maximizing the seller’s payoff, which is also the efficient payoff vector in this set, coincides
with the payoff vector maximizing the seller’s payoff in the veto-incentive compatible program.
That is, as far as efficiency is concerned, bargaining imposes no constraint beyond veto-incentive
compatibility. In all three programs, the ex ante buyer’s payoff is zero in any efficient allocation.
The proof is by construction. This requires us to specify beliefs after out-of-equilibrium offers.
While sequential equilibrium is not well-defined in this game (the action space being infinite),
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our equilibrium can be made sequential by restricting this action set to a sufficiently rich but
finite set of values. In this sense, our choice of off-path beliefs, while dictated by convenience,
is not particularly fragile. Refinements just do not have much bite in an environment as rich as
ours, and even Markov equilibrium does not appear to narrow down the payoff multiplicity. (A
proof of this claim can be found in our online Appendix H, in which we prove that, at least in
the case in which there are finitely many types, the equilibrium strategies used in the proofs can
be modified so as to be Markovian.)

3.4

Examples and Economic Implications

To illustrate the results, we consider here an example with three types.
Example 4 The functions v and c are step functions with three steps, and the two discontinuities
occur for both functions at t = 1/3 and 2/3. To simplify, we refer to those three types as 1, 2,
and 3, assumed to be equally likely. Values and costs are given by
(c1 , c2 , c3 ) = (0, 4, 9), and (v1 , v2 , v3 ) = (2, 5, 12),
so that a higher index means a higher value, but also a higher cost. The left panel of Figure 1
represents the three payoff sets. The largest area is the set of payoffs in the full commitment case,
and the smallest payoff set is the equilibrium payoff set in the bargaining game as δ → 1. In
between lies the set of veto-incentive compatible payoff vectors. By changing only one parameter,
namely, by increasing v2 from 5 to 10, the payoff sets change considerably. See right panel. The
two points (440/1323, 20/63) on the left, and (56/243, 2/9) on the right, represent the unique
equilibrium payoff vectors in the bargaining game in which the (uninformed) buyer makes the
offers in every period, as characterized in Deneckere and Liang (2006; “DL” in the figure) for
δ → 1. As is clear, this (buyer-proposing) equilibrium payoff need not lie in the set of (sellerproposing) equilibrium payoff vectors, although it achieves a lower surplus than the maximum
joint surplus when the seller makes offers. This is no coincidence, see below.
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Figure 1: Full commitment, Veto-Incentive Compatible, and Limiting Equilibrium Payoff Sets.
This example illustrates several points that hold more generally. First, as mentioned, the
buyer’s highest payoff coincides in the veto-incentive compatible and the full commitment programs, but clearly, it might be lower in the equilibrium of the bargaining game. More importantly,
the seller’s highest payoff coincides in the bargaining game and the veto-incentive compatible
program. This highest payoff, however, might fall short of the highest payoff in the commitment
program.17
When is (constrained) efficiency possible under bargaining, i.e., when is veto-incentive compatibility consistent with efficiency? Obviously, this is trivially the case if the optimal allocation
under full commitment is such that no seller’s type trades with interior probability. If some
seller’s types do trade with interior probability, sufficient conditions can be given in terms of the
buyer’s gain function Y (see (7)). Because Y (0) = 0 and Y ′ (0) > 0, yet Y (1) < 0, Y admits a
17

Note also that, as is clear from the left panel, the restriction on achievable payoffs imposed by the lowest
seller’s type reservation payoff is not equivalent to the restriction that the seller obtains the ex ante payoff
E[[v(0) − c(t)]+ ] = 2/3. Consider the vertex that minimizes the seller’s payoff, subject to the buyer’s payoff being
zero. The requirement that the seller’s lowest type gets at least v(0) − c(0) drives the seller’s ex ante payoff up
to 17/18 > 2/3. In this example, driving the seller’s ex ante payoff down to E[[v(0) − c(t)]+ ] is only possible in
some equilibrium for high enough values of the buyer’s payoff.
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smallest local maximizer t. Note that t solves v(t) − c(t) = tc′ (t) (assuming differentiability at
this point for the sake of this discussion). Let also t̄ denote the smallest strictly positive root of
Y . We show in the online appendix (Appendix D) that efficiency is attainable in bargaining if

∀t ≥ t̄ :

Z

t

(v(s) − c(t))ds ≥ 0.

(9)

t

Obviously, as our example above shows (left panel), it is not always true that efficiency can be
achieved. Note that the condition becomes easier to satisfy as gains from trade (v(t) − c(t))
increase, and information rents (tc′ (t)) decrease (both t and t̄ then increase). We summarize this
discussion as follows.
Constrained efficiency can be achieved by bargaining as δ → 1 (even when the firstbest outcome cannot) if gains from trade are high, or information rents low enough.
As an illustration, we consider Samuelson’s Example 1, in which c(t) = t, and v(t) = kt + ∆,
where k, ∆ ≥ 0. (This example subsumes both Akerlof’s linear example (∆ = 0) and the
uniform additive example (k = 1) of Myerson, 1985.) See Figure 2 and Appendix G for details
on Condition (9) in this example. Gains from trade require that ∆ > 1 − k, an area to which
we can restrict attention. When k ≥ 2 or ∆ ≥ 1 − k/2 (Area B), the first-best is implementable
in the veto-incentive compatible (and a fortiori in the full commitment) program. In Area A,
when ∆ ≥

4
4−k

− k, Condition (9) is satisfied. In particular, in Area A, the first-best is not

implementable under full commitment, but imposing veto-incentive compatibility comes at no
additional cost. In the remaining area (for ∆ ∈ [1−k, 4/(4−k)−k)), Condition (9) is not satisfied,
yet the conclusion remains valid: veto-incentive compatibility comes “for free.” This suggests
that veto-incentive compatibility is a relatively weak constraint (but also that the linear-additive
example is somewhat misleading, cf. Example 4). Furthermore, we see that, whether considering
the actual boundary defining when veto-incentive compatibility can be satisfied (∆ = 1 − k),
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Figure 2: Sufficient conditions in Samuelson’s Example 1.
or the boundary computed according to (9), higher gains from trade make it more likely to be
fulfilled.
Because bargaining can achieve the same degree of efficiency as any (incentive compatible,
individually rational) mechanism that satisfies veto-incentive compatibility, this implies that
market institutions may only improve upon bargaining if they constrain the buyer somehow, in a
way that weakens the veto-incentive compatibility constraint. This seems rather demanding, but
not impossible. For instance, screening contracts by the uninformed party (here, the buyer), as in
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), dispense with the requirement of veto-incentive compatibility: the
uninformed party offers (and commits) to a menu of price and quantity pairs, and the informed
party chooses from them. This is not quite as demanding in terms of commitment as full
commitment, although the difference is small (see Mylovanov, 2008). In any event, there is little
to gain from less constraining trading institutions. Note, for instance, that communication will
not expand the set of equilibrium outcomes. (Formally, the set of allocations that are achieved
by communication equilibria is the same as those achieved by perfect Bayesian equilibria in the
bargaining game, as δ → 1). Fortunately, as discussed, circumstances in which veto-incentive
compatibility does not reduce efficiency are quite common, and in those circumstances, as little
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commitment as bargaining suffices.
How do equilibrium outcomes in bargaining compare with the unique equilibrium outcome
derived by Deneckere and Liang, when the buyer makes all the offers? In our two examples, the
seller does worse in the latter equilibrium outcome than in any equilibrium outcome of our game.
However, it is easy to construct examples in which this is not the case. In fact, the following can
be shown (details available upon request).
Lemma 1
i. The allocation from the unique limit equilibrium outcome of the game in which the buyer
makes all the offers is an equilibrium allocation in the game in which the seller makes all the
offers if and only if it gives the lowest seller’s type his reservation payoff ( i.e., v(0) − c(0)),
provided that the discount factor is sufficiently close to one.
ii. For δ close enough to one, the game in which the seller makes all the offers admits an
equilibrium outcome that is strictly more efficient than the limit equilibrium outcome of the
game in which the buyer makes all the offers.
The first statement should come as no surprise given that the allocation that results from
the bargaining game in which the buyer makes all the offers must be veto-incentive compatible.
This follows from the “skimming” property in bargaining: because, from any history onward,
the remaining seller’s types are all types above some threshold zn , and because the buyer’s
continuation payoff must be non-negative, it must be that B(zn ) ≥ 0.18
The second statement is immediately implied by the first, given that the buyer secures a
strictly positive payoff when he makes the offers, yet within the set of veto-incentive compatible
allocations, efficiency is maximized when the buyer gets zero profits.
18

If zn and zn+1 denote consecutive threshold types, the inequality B(t) ≥ 0 for t ∈ (zn , zn+1 ) follows from
the fact that the types in [zn , t] are the most unprofitable ones (for the buyer) above zn .
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Of course, this lemma compares the best equilibrium outcome in one game with the unique
equilibrium outcome in the other. There might be equilibria in the game in which the seller
makes all the offers that are more inefficient that the equilibrium outcome when the buyer makes
offers. Rather surprisingly, our example illustrates that this need not be true, however. As is
obvious from the right panel of Figure 1, efficiency might be necessarily higher when the seller
makes all the offers. This makes apparent that having the seller make all the offers does not
simply “expand” the set of equilibria.

4

Main Proofs

4.1

Proof of Proposition 1 and Theorem 2

The proof of Theorem 2 will be divided in several steps. First, we establish Proposition 1,
which immediately implies Theorem 2.2, given Theorem 1. We will then show how this, along
with some other observations, can be used to establish Theorem 2.1.
The proof of Proposition 1 is itself divided into three parts. First, we show that, given an
allocation (x, p), the condition that B(t) be non-negative for all t is necessary for the allocation
to be implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program. Second, we turn to sufficiency.
We first show that the conditions are sufficient if the functions c and v are step functions. Then
we show how, by appropriate limiting arguments, the result follows for any functions c and v
satisfying the assumptions of the model. For the sake of concision, we relegate the second and
third part to an appendix (online Appendix A); but the gist of the idea can be conveyed in the
simple case in which cost and value functions are step functions with two steps only, and that
this is what is done in Lemma 3 below.
4.1.1

Proof of Proposition 1

First comes necessity.
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Lemma 2 If (x, p) is an allocation that is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program, then, for all t ∈ T ,
B(t) =

Z

1

(x(s)(v(s) − p(s))ds ≥ 0.
t

Proof. Fix an allocation (x, p) that is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program, and let µ denote the corresponding mechanism. Observe that, for all t ∈ T ,
Z

1

x(s)p(s)ds =

t

≤
≤
=

Z

Z
Z

Z

1
t
1
t
1
t
1

Z

Z
Z

pµ(s)[1, dp]ds
R+

R+

Z

v(u)dν(u | p) µ(s)[1, dp]ds
T

R

u≥t

R+



v(u)dν(u | p)

ν([t, 1] | p)

µ(s)[1, dp]ds

x(s)v(s)ds.
t

The first equality follows from the definition of the function p (see (2)). The first inequality is
implied by veto-incentive compatibility; the second follows from the monotonicity of v;19 the last
equality, from the law of iterated expectations. This establishes the claim.
We now show sufficiency in the special case in which c and v are step functions with only one
jump. As mentioned, the complete proof is in online Appendix A.
Lemma 3 Suppose that c and v are step functions with a unique discontinuity point at t̂ ∈ (0, 1) .
Consider the allocation (x, p) defined by

19



 x1 if t < t̂
x (t) =

 x2 if t ≥ t̂



 p1 if t < t̂,
p (t) =

 p2 if t ≥ t̂.

That is, with the understanding that the integrand is zero when ν([t, 1] | p) = 0.
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Suppose that (x, p) is implementable in the full commitment program, and for every t ∈ T ,

B(t) =

Z

1

(x(s)(v(s) − p(s))ds ≥ 0.
t

Then (x, p) is also implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program.
Let v1 and v2 ≥ v1 denote the two values that the function v takes. The hypothesis that
B (t) ≥ 0 for every t ∈ T implies that v2 ≥ p2 and

t̂x1 (v1 − p1 ) + 1 − t̂ x2 (v2 − p2 ) ≥ 0.
Incentive compatibility implies that x1 ≥ x2 and p1 ≤ p2 . It follows that there exists z ∈
i
h
x2
0, x1 such that
zx1 p1 + (x2 − zx1 ) v2 = x2 p2 .

(10)

To see this, notice that for z = 0, the left-hand side reduces to x2 v2 , which is (weakly) larger
than the right-hand side. On the other hand, for z =

x2
,
x1

the left-hand side reduces to x2 p1 ,

which is (weakly) smaller than the right-hand side.
Consider now the following random mechanism. When the seller announces a low type (i.e.,
a type smaller than t̂), the buyer receives the offer p1 with probability x1 (with probability 1 − x1
no offer is made and there is no trade). When the seller announces a high type, the buyer receives
the offer p1 with probability zx1 and the offer v2 with probability x2 − zx1 (again, there is no
trade with the remaining probability).
It is immediate to check that the above mechanism implements the allocation (x, p). Consequently, it satisfies the seller’s incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints.
We now show the mechanism also satisfies the buyer’s veto incentive compatibility constraints.
Notice that the buyer receives the offer v2 only if the seller’s type is high. Clearly, the buyer is
willing to accept that offer. Finally, suppose that the buyer receives the offer p1 . His expected
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payoff (conditional on p1 ) is equal to



1

t̂x1 (v1 − p1 ) + 1 − t̂ zx1 (v2 − p1 ) .
t̂x1 + 1 − t̂ zx1



We multiply the above expression by t̂x1 + 1 − t̂ zx1 and add and subtract 1 − t̂ x2 (v2 − p2 )
to obtain




t̂x1 (v1 − p1 ) + 1 − t̂ x2 (v2 − p2 ) − 1 − t̂ x2 (v2 − p2 ) + 1 − t̂ zx1 (v2 − p1 ) =

t̂x1 (v1 − p1 ) + 1 − t̂ x2 (v2 − p2 ) ≥ 0,

where the equality follows from the definition of z in (10). We conclude that the buyer is also
willing to accept the offer p1 and the allocation (x, p) is implementable in the veto-incentive
compatible program.
4.1.2

Proof of Theorem 2.1

To establish Theorem 2.1, it remains to show that the payoff set of the veto-incentive compatible program can be obtained by assuming that:
1. all local incentive compatibility constraints are binding;
2. the highest type of the seller that trades with positive probability has a zero payoff;
3. the lowest type of the seller trades with probability 1, that is x(0) = 1.
Let us refer to the resulting payoff set as ΠV . Note that this set is compact and convex.
These three claims are established by considering the boundary of ΠV . Because both properties
are preserved under convex combinations, the result follows for the entire set. The details are
somewhat tedious and also relegated to Appendix A.
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4.2

Proof of Theorem 3

This theorem is proved by considering the set of extreme points of the payoff set, distinguishing them according to whether an extreme point lies to the “north-east,” “north-west,”
or “south-west” (i.e., according to the signs of the weights on the seller’s and buyer’s payoff
whose linear combination this extreme point maximizes). Arguments for one case require minor
modifications for the other cases.20 For brevity, we only provide the complete proof for the case
of positive weights, that is, we consider extreme points that lie on the Pareto-frontier.
The proof is divided into two steps. First, we show how allocations for which x is a step
function satisfying some properties can be implemented as equilibria. Second, we show that
every vertex of the equilibrium payoff set is the limit of a sequence of such allocations.
4.2.1

Regular Allocations

We first define a class of allocations (x, p). Recall that, for t1 < t2 , vtt12 := E[v(t) | t ∈ [t1 , t2 )].
Definition 1 The allocation (x, p) is regular if there exist 0 = t0 < t1 < · · · < tK ≤ 1, for some
finite K, such that:
1. For some thresholds 1 = x1 > · · · > xK > 0,


 xk if t ∈ [tk−1 , tk ) , k = 1, . . . , K,
x (t) =

 0 if t ≥ tK ;

2. For some prices v (0) ≤ p1 < · · · < pK ,


 pk if t ∈ [tk−1 , tk ) , k = 1, . . . , K,
p (t) =

 0 if t ≥ tK ;
3. For each k = 1, . . . , K − 1,

20

For instance, in the “south-west” region, the local incentive constraints are binding “downward,” and the
definition of regular allocations must be modified accordingly.
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xk (pk − c (tk,− )) = xk+1 (pk+1 − c (tk,− )) ,

where tk,− = limt↑tk t, and xK (pK − c (tK− )) ≥ 0;
4. Furthermore, we have B (0) ≥ 0, B (t1 ) = · · · = B (tK−2) = 0, and B (tK−1 ) > 0;
t

K−1
5. Finally, vtK−2
> c(tK−1,− ).

That is, a regular allocation is a step allocation such that local incentive compatibility constraints hold at each jump, the contribution to the buyer’s payoff of each interval of types [tk , 1] is
zero except for k = 0, K −1, and positive for t = 0, K −1 (strictly so for t = K −1). Furthermore,
the expected valuation of the buyer over the penultimate interval of types exceeds the cost of
the seller’s highest type in the previous interval, and the seller’s lowest type must guarantee his
security payoff.
Regular allocations are perfect candidates for equilibrium outcomes: one may think of each
jump as defining an interim allocation (truncated according to the jumps) that satisfies incentive
compatibility (for the seller) and individual rationality for the buyer at every step, as well as
(by (1) and (2)) for the seller ex ante. In addition, regular allocations span a rich set of payoff
vectors, as we will show that we can approximate every extreme point of the payoff set by a
sequence of payoffs of regular allocations.
But a regular allocation need not be an equilibrium allocation in the discrete-time game,
because of the indivisibilities that discrete periods introduce. This indivisibility becomes less
and less problematic as δ → 1, and we show that we can choose (xδ , pδ ) such that
k(xδ , pδ )k → k(x, p)k,
uniformly in t, as δ → 1. The following lemma will be established in the next two subsections.
Lemma 4 Fix a regular allocation (x, p). There exists a sequence of σ δ ∈ E(δ) such that the
corresponding sequence of allocations (xδ , pδ ) converges to (x, p) as δ → 1, uniformly in t.
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t

K−1
> v (0) (notice that
In what follows, we consider regular allocations with K > 2 and vtK−2

the last condition is automatically satisfied by regular allocations with K > 3). This simplifies
the notation since we are able to show that for δ sufficiently large the regular allocation (x, p)
is an equilibrium allocation (i.e., we have exact implementation). The proof for the remaining
cases is very similar, but requires additional notation (in such cases we only have approximate
implementation). We first establish some properties that regular allocations satisfy and then
present the equilibrium of the bargaining game.
4.2.2

Properties of Regular Allocations
t

K−1
K
. Thus,
It follows from B (tK−2 ) = 0, B (tK−1 ) > 0 and pK > pK−1 , that vtK−2
< pK−1 < vttK−2

there exists a unique β ∈ (0, 1) such that
t

K−1
K
.
+ (1 − β) vtK−2
pK−1 = βvttK−2

(11)

t

K−1
> c(tK−1,− ) and the incentive compatibility constraint
Using B (tK−2 ) = 0, vtK−2

xK−1 (pK−1 − c (tK−1,− )) = xK (pK − c (tK−1,− )) ,

it is easy to show that β also satisfies
t

xK − xK−1 β = xK−1 (1 − β)

K−1
− c (tK−1,− )
vtK−2
K
− c (tK−1,− )
vttK−1

!

> 0,

and
K
K
= xK pK
+ (xK − xK−1 β) vttK−1
xK−1 βvttK−2

As the last step in the proof of Lemma 4, we show that the allocation (x, p) can be implemented in the bargaining game when the discount factor δ is sufficiently large.
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4.2.3

The equilibrium σ δ of the bargaining game

First, we describe the players’ on-path behavior. Then we turn to the off-path behavior.
The behavior of the types in the intervals [t0 , t1 ) and [tK , 1] is very simple. In the first period
of the game, the seller’s types in [t0 , t1 ) make the offer p1 and the buyer accepts it. In every
period n = 1, 2, . . . , the types in [tK , 1] make the losing offer v (1) and the buyer rejects it.
Consider now the types in the interval [tk−1 , tk ), k = 2, . . . , K −2. In each period n = 1, 2, . . . ,
they make the offer pk . In each period, the buyer accepts the offer pk with probability ψ k =

xk (1−δ)
.
1−xk δ

Therefore, the discounted probability that the offer pk is accepted is equal to
ψ k + δ (1 − ψ k ) ψ k + δ 2 (1 − ψ k )2 ψ k + · · · = xk .

The remaining types to consider are those in the last two intervals. Let n̂ denote the integer that
satisfies21
δ n̂+2 ≤ xK−1 < δ n̂+1 .
Also, let β̂ ∈ (0, 1) be such that δ n̂ β̂ = xK−1 β.
The types in [tK−2, tK−1 ) and the types in [tK−1 , tK ) adopt the same behavior in the first n̂
periods of the game. In particular, in period n = 1, . . . , n̂ − 1 they all make the losing offer v (1)
K
. The buyer accepts this
which the buyer rejects. In period n̂, these type make the offer vttK−2

offer with probability β̂.
K
in period n̂, then the types in the two intervals behave
If the buyer rejects the offer vttK−2

t

K−1
differently. In each period n̂ + 1, n̂ + 2, . . . , the types in [tK−2, tK−1 ) make the offer vtK−2
. In each

period, the buyer accepts this offer with probability ψ K−1 . This probability is such that
xK−1 = δn̂
21



β̂ + 1 − β̂ δ

ψ K−1

1 − δ 1 − ψ K−1

Notice that n̂ is well defined for δ sufficiently close to one.
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!!

.

Notice that ψ K−1 ∈ (0, 1) since δ n̂+1 > xK−1 . Furthermore
ψ K−1
 = 1.
δ→1 1 − δ 1 − ψ
K−1

(12)

lim

K
. The buyer
Finally, in each period n̂ + 1, n̂ + 2, . . . , the types in [tK−1 , tK ) make the offer vttK−1

accepts each offer with probability ψ K which is chosen to satisfy


 
xK = δ β̂ + 1 − β̂ δ
n̂

ψK
1 − δ (1 − ψ K )



.

Again,ψ K ∈ (0, 1) since xK > xK−1 β and δ n̂+1 > xK−1 > xK .
Notice that if both players follow the behavior that we have just described, then each type
t ∈ [tk−1 , tk ), k = 1, . . . , k, trades the good with discounted probability equal to xk and receives
the discounted expected transfer xk pk .22 In other words, the players’ behavior implements the
regular allocation (x, p).
To see that this behavior is part of an equilibrium, consider all possible deviations in turn.
First, we analyze the buyer’s deviations. Notice that there is only deviation which is detectable
and that, at the same time, does not end the game. This happens when the buyer rejects the
offer p1 in the first period. Then the types in [t0 , t1 ) keep making the same offer p1 until the
buyer accepts it. On the other hand, the buyer accepts the serious offer p1 in the first period
in which is made. Finally, suppose that the buyer deviates when he is supposed to randomize.
Then, following this deviation (which is not detectable), he goes back to the behavior described
above.
Consider now the seller’s deviations. The buyer accepts an off-path offer if and only if the
offer is weakly smaller than v (0) . Following an off-path history of offers, type t of the seller offers
v (0) in every future period if v (0) ≥ c (t) . Otherwise type t offers v (1) in every future period.
It is simple to verify that the strategy profile just described constitutes an equilibrium (or
22

As mentioned above, the types above tK do not trade the good and do not receive a transfer.
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rather, that there exists a belief system along which this strategy profile is an equilibrium) when
δ is sufficiently large. By construction, each type t, prefers his own strategy to the strategy of
type t′ . Thus, any type t ∈ [0, 1] does not any incentive to mimic the equilibrium behavior of
another type t′ . Also, type t does not have any incentive to deviate and make an off-path offer
strictly larger than v (0) (the offer would be rejected) or strictly smaller than v (0) (the type
would be strictly better off by making the off-path offer v (0)). Finally, it follows from equality
t

K−1
(12), from the condition vtK−2
> v (0) , and from the incentive compatibility constraints that for

δ sufficiently close to one, no type has an incentive to deviate and make the off-path offer v (0) .
Conditional on receiving the offer p1 in the the first period, the buyer’s expected payoff is
weakly positive. Thus, he has an incentive to accept the offer. Conditional on receiving any
other on-path offer, the buyer’s expected payoff is zero. Therefore it is optimal to randomize.
The off-path behavior can be easily made sequentially rational by assuming that following
any deviation the buyer assigns probability one to the event that the seller’s type is t = 0. (This
might be seen as an extreme belief revision, but it is convenient, and other possibilities would
do just as well.)
4.2.4

Proof of Theorem 3, Conclusion

The previous subsections have shown that any regular allocation can be achieved as an equilibrium allocation in the bargaining game as δ → 1. Note that the set of equilibrium payoffs that
can be achieved in the bargaining game is a subset of the set of payoffs spanned by the allocations
described in Theorem 3, because the constraint π S (0) ≥ v(0)−c(0) must hold, as explained before
the theorem. Also, equilibrium allocations must satisfy veto-incentive compatibility. Therefore,
one direction of the Theorem 3 is obvious. The other direction will be established if we can
show that every extreme point of the set of veto-incentive compatible payoffs giving the seller his
security payoff can be approximated arbitrarily closely by regular allocations. This is the content
of Lemma 5. Recall that, for brevity, we restrict ourselves here to the case of extreme points
35

of the payoff set that lie on the Pareto-frontier. The following is proved in the online appendix
(Appendix B). This Appendix also shows how the result extends to the case of a finite (rather
than infinite) horizon. The following lemma concludes the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 5 For every extreme point (πS , π B ) (on the north-east boundary) of the payoff set that
can be achieved by veto-incentive compatible allocations for which π S (0) ≥ v(0) − c(0), and every
ε > 0, there exists a regular allocation whose payoff is within distance ε of (πS , π B ).

5

Extensions
This section addresses three issues. First, we show that veto-incentive compatibility is implied

by standard bargaining protocols (Section 5.1), as mentioned in the introduction. Second, we
discuss the impact of imposing similar requirements on the seller’s side (Section 5.2). Modern
commercial law emphasizes buyer’s rights. It is then natural to ask whether this is compatible
with protection of the seller, and whether mechanisms can be found that are agreeable to both
the buyer and the seller not only ex ante, but also ex interim.
Finally, in Section 5.3, we dwell on an important qualification to our analysis. Our results
characterize those ex ante payoffs that can be achieved under different levels of commitment.
These characterizations do not carry over from payoffs to allocations, as we explain.

5.1

Bargaining Outcomes Satisfy Veto-Incentive Compatibility

Veto-incentive compatibility is not only sensible from a practical point of view, it can also be
shown to be automatically satisfied by most bargaining protocols that appear in the literature.
This is formally established here. We define bargaining games satisfying the following extensive
forms: (i) Nature selects one party to make an offer at the first stage n = 0 (independently
of the type). This party offers a price p ∈ R, whereupon the other party decides to accept it
or not. If the other party accepts and the seller’s type is t, then the buyer obtains a payoff
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v(t) − p, whereas the seller obtains a payoff p − c(t). If the offer is rejected, Nature ends the
game with probability θ(h1 ), where h1 is the public history. If the game does not end, nature
determines that the buyer makes an offer with probability χ(h1 ) and the seller makes an offer
with probability 1−χ(h1 ). The game proceeds accordingly. The non-increasing sequence {δ n }n≥0
determines the common discount factor of period n (as evaluated from period 0, e.g., in the case
of geometric discounting, δ n = δ n ). We normalize δ 0 to 1 and assume continuity at infinity,
limn→∞ δ n = 0. Notice that our protocol encompasses alternate-offers protocols, protocols in
which the buyer makes all the offers as well as finite-horizon protocols (set δ n = 0 for all n > T ).
Any such extensive form, alongside the incomplete information and the utility function, defines
a multi-stage game of observed actions. We define perfect Bayesian equilibria of such a game
and the corresponding allocation as in Section 3.3. Proposition 2 proves that any equilibrium of
the bargaining game satisfies veto-incentive compatibility. (See Online Appendix F for a proof.)
Proposition 2 Any perfect Bayesian equilibrium allocation satisfies veto-incentive compatibility.

5.2

Limited Commitment on the Seller’s Side

Veto-incentive compatibility weakens the commitment assumption made in the full commitment program on the buyer’s side. As discussed, this is a relaxation that is relevant for many
actual market institutions. Furthermore, our characterization of the equilibrium payoffs in the
bargaining game suggests that this is the “right” relaxation, namely, the absence of commitment
on either side, as captured by the bargaining game, appears to impose no further constraints on
achievable payoffs, aside from the security payoff that the seller must secure.23
It is then natural to ask whether one could derive results that mirror those of Section 3.2 in
which the seller’s commitment, instead of, or in addition to, the buyer’s commitment is relaxed.
23

Of course, in bargaining, the seller is not formally allowed to withdraw an offer that he makes, but why would
he? Acceptance by the buyer reveals no information, so a seller that anticipates withdrawing an offer might as
well not submit it.
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While we shall not attempt to obtain a characterization for each possible case, we discuss here
the relationship between the different sets of allocations and payoffs. As we shall see, limited
commitment on the seller’s side is arguably less of a problem than on the buyer’s side.
Unlike the buyer, the seller gets an opportunity to influence the terms at which the trade
would take place. Therefore, there are two possible ways of modeling the absence of commitment
on the seller’s side. A mechanism is ex post individually rational for the seller if the price p that
is offered to the buyer is always higher than the cost of the seller’s reported type t:
∀t ∈ T :

Z

µ(t)[1, dp] = 0.

[0,c(t))

This guarantees that the seller never loses from the mechanism, but it does not give him the
authority to actually prevent the trade. Alternatively, we might endow the seller with the ability
to block the trade given the realized price. This notion, in line with Forges’ original definition of
veto-incentive compatibility, is more demanding than ex post individual rationality: the ability
to block the trade affects the seller’s incentives to report his type truthfully, as the payoff from
making a given report must include the option value from blocking the trade if the realized price
happens to be below the seller’s actual cost. To be more formal, we re-define the payoff of the
type t seller that reports s, from a given mechanism µ, as
S

π̂ (s | t) =

Z

1{p≥c(t)} (p − c(t))µ(s)[1, dp].
R+

A mechanism is seller veto-incentive compatible if it is incentive compatible given the payoff π̂,
and the allocation (x, p) is implementable in the seller’s veto-incentive compatible program if
there is a mechanism that is seller veto-incentive compatible and induces the allocation (x, p),
according to (1)–(2), taking into account that trade does not take place for prices below c(t). To
distinguish this notion from veto-incentive compatibility as defined in Section 2, the latter will
now be referred to as buyer veto-incentive compatibility.
Does seller veto-incentive compatibility, or even ex post individual rationality restrict the set
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of implementable allocations, or the set of achievable payoff vectors? In a nutshell, the answer is
no, as far as payoffs are concerned, and sometimes, as far as allocations are concerned, but only
if it comes in addition to buyer veto-incentive compatibility. Formally:
Proposition 3
i. The set of implementable allocations (and thus, of achievable payoff vectors) in the full
commitment program remains unchanged if seller veto-incentive compatibility is imposed.
ii. The set of implementable allocations (and thus, of achievable payoff vectors) in the buyer
veto-incentive compatible program remains unchanged if seller ex post individual rationality
is imposed.
iii. The set of achievable payoff vectors in the buyer veto-incentive compatible program remains
unchanged if seller veto-incentive compatibility is imposed.
Because seller veto-incentive compatibility implies seller ex post individual rationality, we have
omitted some relationships that follow from the proposition. For instance, from (i), it follows
that seller ex post individual rationality does not restrict the set of implementable allocations in
the full commitment program. Furthermore, all remaining inclusions are strict: that is, for some
parameters, the set of implementable allocations in the buyer veto-incentive compatible program
is strictly reduced if seller veto-incentive compatibility is imposed, and, as we know, the set of
implementable allocations in the veto-incentive compatible program is strictly contained in the
set of allocations of the full commitment program, for some parameters.
The proofs of the claims in Proposition 3, some of which follow arguments that are similar to
the other proofs in the paper, are sketched in the online appendix (Appendix E).24 Additional
details, as well as examples establishing the strict inequalities, are available from the authors.
24

More precisely, we show in Appendix E that seller ex post individual rationality does not restrict the set of
allocations that can be achieved in the (buyer) veto-incentive compatible program, and that, as far as payoffs are
concerned, we can also impose seller veto-incentive compatibility. In both cases, attention is restricted to finite
types, and the result in the general case follows by standard limiting arguments.
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5.3

Payoffs vs. Allocations

Our characterization of veto-incentive compatibility and equilibrium outcomes in the bargaining game were cast in terms of the agents’ expected payoffs, not in terms of allocations. For
some important criteria, this makes no difference: the efficient payoff, the buyer’s highest payoff,
for instance, are implemented by a unique allocation. However, our result does not extend to
allocations in general. Not every incentive-compatible allocation whose payoffs satisfy the conditions of the characterization is implementable. For instance, not every allocation that gives the
seller’s lowest type a profit π S (0) ≥ v(0) − c(0) need be implementable. Suppose that there are
three equiprobable types of seller (and buyer), and consider parameters such that the highest
cost, c3 , is lower than the expected value of the lower two values, (v1 + v2 )/2. Further, consider
an incentive compatible allocation in which the buyer’s expected payoff is 0, the highest seller’s
type does not trade, but the second highest does; this seller’s intermediate type gets a positive
profit, and the seller’s lowest type gets a payoff exceeding v(0)−c(0); by our results, the resulting
expected payoffs are equilibrium payoffs in the bargaining game when frictions are small.25
Yet this specific allocation, which requires the seller’s high type not to trade, cannot be
implemented in the bargaining game. To see this, note that the buyer will never accept an offer
that gives him a strictly negative payoff, and therefore, because the buyer’s expected payoff is
zero, it must be that his expected payoff is also zero, conditional on any offer that is submitted
with positive probability, after any history. By the martingale property of beliefs, there is a
sequence of equilibrium offers along which the buyer’s expected value, conditional on these offers,
is non-decreasing, and therefore, at least as large as (v1 + v2 )/2 > c3 . This sequence of offers
must involve offers accepted with positive probability, for otherwise the seller’s intermediate type
would not be willing to follow it. By mimicking this sequence of offers, the seller’s highest type
guarantees a strictly positive profit, a contradiction.
25

Such an example is easy to find with a mathematical software: for instance, it occurs for the parameters
c1 = 1, c2 = 5970/2142, c3 = 175/51, and v1 = 134/65, v2 = 2458/509, v3 = 5. The allocation is x1 = 1, x2 =
1309475796/1359864155, x3 = 0, p1 = 926734382/271972831, p2 = 898659860/271972831, p3 = 0.
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Online Appendix: Omitted Proofs (Not for Publication)
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 and Theorem 2.1
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1 (Remaining Details)
In the proof, Lemma 3 only covers the special case in which cost and value functions are
step functions with two steps only. This appendix covers the general case in which no such
assumption is made. The proof is in two steps. First, an induction on the number of steps is
made to generalize Lemma 3 to an arbitrary number of steps. Second, a limiting argument is
used to establish the result for arbitrary (not necessarily step) functions c and v.
Lemma 6 If c and v are step functions, and (x, p) is an allocation that is implementable in the
full commitment program, and such that, for all t ∈ T ,

B(t) =

Z

1

(x(s)(v(s) − p(s))ds ≥ 0,
t

then (x, p) is also implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program.
Proof. Since c and v are step functions, we may equivalently describe the environment as
finite: there are N types, with cost and values

c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cN , and v1 ≤ v2 ≤ · · · ≤ vN .

To avoid some trivial but distracting complications, we shall assume that the inequalities involving costs are strict: ∀i < n, ci < ci+1 . The probability of each type ( i.e., the length of
each step) is denoted qi .26 An allocation, then, reduces to a pair of vectors x = (x1 , . . . , xN ),
26

More precisely, the number of types N is the number of types ti ∈ T for which either c or v (or both) has a
discontinuity. The length of the interval refers to the intervals defined by the corresponding partition of T .
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p = (p1 , . . . , pN ).
The hypothesis that B(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ T implies that, for all J = 1, . . . , N,
N
X

xi qi vi ≥

i=J

N
X

xi qi pi .

(13)

i=J

We shall show that any incentive-compatible, individually rational allocation satisfying this condition can be implemented in the veto-incentive compatible program, using N prices. The proof
is by induction on the number of types (uniformly over all cost, values and probabilities).
Note that this is true for N = 1. In that case, the buyer’s individual rationality constraint
implies p1 ≤ v1 (which trivially implies our hypothesis), while the seller’s individual rationality
constraint implies p1 ≥ c1 . Note then that any such allocation (x1 , p1 ) with p1 ∈ [c1 , v1 ] satisfies
the veto-incentive compatibility constraint: conditional on p1 , the buyer assigns probability one
to the (unique) type 1, and since v1 ≥ p1 , his payoff conditional on this event is positive.
Assume then that, whenever there are N types, and for any collection of costs, values and
probabilities {(c1 , v1 , q1 ), . . . , (cN , vN , qN )}, any incentive compatible, individually rational allocation {(x1 , p1 ), . . . , (xN , pN )} that satisfies (13) can be implemented in the veto-incentive compatible program with N (not necessarily distinct) prices. Consider the case of N + 1 types, with
+1
cost, values and probabilities {ci , vi , qi }N
i=1 . Fix some incentive compatible, individually rational

allocation
{(x1 , p1 ), . . . , (xN +1 , pN +1 )} ,
satisfying (13). The argument is divided into three steps.
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Step 1. Note that, by (13) with J = N + 1, pN +1 ≤ vN +1 . Also, incentive compatibility
implies that pN ≤ pN +1 .

27

It follows that there exists z ∈ [0, xN +1 /xN ] such that

zxN pN + (xN +1 − zxN ) vN +1 = xN +1 pN +1 .

(14)

To see this, note that, for z = 0, the left-hand side reduces to xN +1 vN +1 , which is at least as
large as the right-hand side, while for z = xN +1 /xN , the left-hand side reduces to xN +1 pN , which
is at most as large as the right-hand side. Fix some z satisfying (28).
Step 2. Consider the game in which there are N types, with costs and values {ĉi , v̂i , q̂i }N
i=1 ,
defined as follows. Costs are unchanged: ĉi := ci , all i = 1, . . . , N. Values are given by

v̂i := vi for i < N, and v̂N :=

qN vN + qN +1 zvN +1
,
qN + qN +1 z

(note that v̂N ≥ vN > ĉN ), while probabilities are

q̂i := P

qN + qN +1 z
qi
for i < N, and q̂N := P
.
j≤N qj + qN +1 z
i≤N qi + qN +1 z

N +1
We claim that the allocation {(xi , pi )}N
i=1 (derived from {(xi , pi )}i=1 ) is implementable, in this

new environment, in the veto-incentive compatible program.
First, because costs are the same in this environment as in the original environment, individual
rationality and incentive compatibility for all seller’s types is implied by the fact that these were
+1
satisfied by the allocation {(xi , pi )}N
i=1 in the original environment.
27

The argument is standard: considering the two incentive compatibility conditions involving types N and
N + 1 only, it follows that xN ≥ xN +1 and pN ≤ pN +1 .
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Therefore, to show that this allocation is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible
program, given the induction hypothesis, it suffices to show that, for all J ≤ N,
N
X

xi q̂i v̂i ≥

i=J

N
X

xi q̂i pi .

i=J

(Note that individual rationality for the buyer is the special case J = 1.) Simplifying,
N
X

1
xi q̂i (v̂i − pi ) = P
i≤N qi + qN +1 z

i=J



PN −1
i=J

xi qi (vi − pi ) + qN xN (vN − pN ) + qN +1 xN z (vN +1 − pN )

Adding and subtracting (xN +1 − xN z) vN +1 to the expression inside the square brackets yield
N
X
i=J



PN −1



1
i=J xi qi (vi − pi ) + qN xN (vN − pN ) +


.

i≤N qi + qN +1 z
qN +1 (xN +1 vN +1 − xN zpN − (xN +1 − xN z) vN +1 )

xi q̂i (v̂i − pi ) = P

Using the definition of z, we finally obtain
N
X
i=J

"N +1
#
X
1
xi qi (vi − pi ) ≥ 0,
xi q̂i (v̂i − pi ) = P
i≤N qi + qN +1 z
i=J

where the last inequality uses that, by assumption, the allocation satisfies (13).
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, the allocation {(xi , pi )}N
i=1 is implementable in the
veto-incentive compatible program, in this new environment, with N prices. Let {r̂1 , . . . , r̂N }
be the prices that implement this allocation in the veto-incentive compatible program, and
{x̂1 (r) , . . . , x̂N (r)}r∈{r̂1 ,...,r̂N } be the probabilities assigned to these prices.
Step 3. We now construct a set of prices {r1 , . . . , rN +1 } and probabilities {x1 (r) , . . . , xN +1 (r)},
r ∈ {r1 , . . . , rN +1 }, that implement {(x1 , p1 ), . . . , (xN +1 , pN +1 )} in the veto-incentive compatible
program, in the original environment.
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.

The prices are given by

{r1 , . . . , rN +1 } = {r̂1 , . . . , r̂N } ∪ {vN +1 } .

The probabilities are given by, for i < N + 1,

xi (r) = x̂i (r) , ∀r ∈ {r̂1 , . . . , r̂N } , and xi (vN +1 ) = 0,

and
xN +1 (r) = zx̂N (r) ∀r ∈ {r̂1 , . . . , r̂N } , and xN +1 (vN +1 ) = xN +1 − zxN .
It is immediate to see that, conditional on any given r ∈ {r̂1 , . . . , r̂N }, the conditional value is the
same as in the modified environment, so that the buyer’s veto-incentive compatibility constraint
holds. This is also true if r = vN +1 , because the only seller’s type trading at this price is type
N + 1. Furthermore, by construction, buyer i trades with probability xi and receives an average
price pi . This completes the proof.
Finally, we can show sufficiency for arbitrary cost and value functions.
Lemma 7 If (x, p) is an individually rational and incentive compatible allocation such that, for
all t ∈ T ,
B(t) =

Z

1

x(s)[v(s) − p(s)]ds ≥ 0,

t

then (x, p) is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program.
Proof. Fix an allocation (x, p) that satisfies the assumptions of the lemma. Consider a
sequence of partitions P n = {tn1 , . . . , tnn }, with tn1 = 0, tnn = 1, maxi |tni − tni+1 | < K/n for some
constant K independent of n, and such that D ⊆ P n , where D is the set of discontinuities of
either v or c (without loss of generality, assume that n is large enough to include this finite set).
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We now define a sequence of functions cn , v n : T → R+ as follows: for all t < 1, set cn (t) :=




c(tnj ) for t ∈ tnj , tnj+1 , cn (1) := c(tnn−1 ), as well as, for all t < 1, v n (t) := v(tnj+1 ) for t ∈ tnj , tnj+1 ,
v n (1) := v(tnn ).

Further, define the sequence of allocations xn , pn as follows: for all t ∈ T , set xn (t) := x(tnj ),




and pn (t) := p(tnj ) for t ∈ tnj , tnj+1 , j < n − 1 (t ∈ tnj , tnj+1 if j = n.)28

Note that the allocation (xn , pn ) is incentive compatible and individually rational for the

seller given the functions (cn , v n ) (because the choices of the types in the set P n are incentive
compatible and individually rational given the original allocation (x, p).) Define
Bjn

:=

Z

1

xn (s)[v n (s) − pn (s)]ds.

tn
j

Because x(tnj+1 ) ≤ x(t) ≤ x(tnj ) and p(tnj+1 ) ≤ p(t) ≤ p(tnj ) (by incentive compatibility) for
t ∈ [tnj , tnj + 1), j < i − 1, we can pick these sequences such that, because B(tnj ) ≥ 0 (the lemma’s
hypothesis), it is also the case that also Bjn ≥ 0 for all j (clearly, Bnn = 0). Therefore, the
allocation (xn , pn ) is individually rational for the buyer given (cn , v n ) and further, given Lemma
7, this allocation is veto-incentive compatible in the game with cost and value functions (cn , v n ).
Let µn denote the corresponding mechanism. The mechanism µn defines a function xn specifying
the probability of trade given some message t, and a joint distribution µ̃n on T × R+ in case
that there is a trade for each type.29 Let µ̂n denote the product distribution whose marginals
coincide with those of µ̃n . Note that incentive compatibility and veto-incentive compatibility are
restrictions on the marginal distributions only, so that any mechanism inducing the pair xn and
µ̂n also implements (xn , pn ). Note that, by construction, (xn , pn ) converge (pointwise) to (x, p),
and similarly, (cn , v n ) converge pointwise to (c, v). Also, since we can replace the set of prices
R+ by the compact interval [0, v(1)] (because v(1) is an upper bound on the price that can be in
28

Note that the functions v n , cn as well as the allocations xn , pn are right-continuous.
More precisely, x = µ(·) [1, R+ ], as defined in Section 2, and the distribution µ̃ is the joint distribution
ν((1, ·), ·), where ν is the conditional distribution defined in Section 2 as well.
29
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the support of any mechanism that is veto-incentive compatible), a subsequence of the sequence
{µ̂n } (without loss of generality the sequence itself) must converge weakly to some distribution
µ̂. It follows from Theorem 3.2 of Billinsgley (1968) that µ̂ must itself be a product distribution,
and that the marginals of µ̂n converge weakly to the marginals of µ̂. Therefore, for all prices p,
the marginal distribution µ̂n (· | p) converges weakly to µ̂(· | p), and so it follows that, for all p,
Z

µ̂(t | p)(v(t) − p)dt ≥ 0,

T

which is precisely the requirement of veto-incentive compatibility. Therefore, along with x, µ̂ defines a veto-incentive compatible mechanism. (Incentive compatibility and individual rationality
are satisfied by hypothesis, given the limiting allocation (x, p)).
Note that Lemma 2 and 7 immediately imply Proposition 1.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2.1
Here, we prove the three claims stated in Section 4.1.2. Assume that v > c. (Simple changes
have to be made otherwise.) Given (x, p), let t̄ := sup{t ∈ T : x(t) > 0}.30
Clearly, (0, 0) is an extreme point of this set, and because it is achieved by the allocation
(x, p) = (0, 0), the claims are trivially valid for this point. We further divide this boundary into
ΠV− := {(π S , πB ) ∈ R2 : π B = max(π1 ,π2 )∈ΠV π 2 s.t. π 1 ≤ π S } and ΠV+ := {(π S , π B ) ∈ R2 : π B =
max(π1 ,π2 )∈ΠV π 2 s.t. π 1 ≥ π S }. As will be clear, ΠV+ intersects the axis {(πS , 0) : π S ∈ R}, so
that ΠV = co {(0, 0)} ∪ ΠV+ ∪ ΠV− , where, given any set A, co A denotes the convex hull of A.
Let us establish three claims for ΠV+ ∪ ΠV− at once. If (x, p) achieves π ∈ ΠV+ ∪ ΠV− , then
1. lims↓t πS (s | t) = π S (t) for all t. Suppose that this is not the case. First, consider the case


in which the payoff is in ΠV+ . Take the supremum over t̂ such that π S t̂ > lims↓t π S s | t̂ .
Clearly, t̂ is a point of discontinuity of c (t) and x (t). Consider then the following alternative

30

Not to be confused with t̄ as defined in (9).
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allocation (x′ , p′ ), defined by
x′ (t) = x (t) + ε if t ∈ [t̂, t̂ + ε), x′ (t) = x (t)

otherwise;

p̄′ (t) = p̄ (t) + εc (t + ε) if t ∈ [t̂, t̂ + ε), p̄′ (t) = p̄ (t) otherwise.
It is straightforward to see that, for small enough ε > 0, this is incentive-compatible,
satisfies B (t) ≥ 0 for all t and strictly improves the buyer’s payoff, while weakly improving
the seller’s payoff. Consider next the case in which the payoff of (x, p) belongs to ΠV− . Take


the supremum over t̂ such that π t̂ > lims↓t π s | t̂ . Clearly, t̂ is a point of discontinuity

of c (t). Thus consider the alternative allocation (x′ , p′ ), defined by
x′ (t) = x (t)

for all t ∈ [0, 1] ,

p̄′ (t) = p̄ (t) − ε if t ∈ [0, t̂); p̄′ (t) = p̄ (t)

otherwise.

It is straightforward to check that for small ε > 0 this allocation is implementable. Moreover, it decreases the seller’s payoff and increases the buyer’s payoff, which contradicts the
assumption that the payoff is in ΠV− .
2. π S (t̄− ) = 0, where t̄ := sup{t ≤ 1 : x(t) > 0} is the highest seller’s type that trades with
positive probability. Suppose towards a contradiction that this is not the case. Consider
first the case in which the payoff is in ΠV− . Modify the allocation by decreasing p(t) (for all
t such that x(t) > 0) by some small ε > 0, contradicting that π ∈ ΠV− . Suppose next that
π ∈ ΠV+ . Fix some small η > 0 and let t∗ := sup {t : x (t) − x (t̄− ) > η}. Since the allocation
is right-continuous, x (t∗ ) ≤ x (t̄− ) + η. Thus, define p̂ such that x (t∗ ) (p (t∗ ) − c (t∗ )) =
[x (t̄− ) + η] (p̂ − c (t∗ )), and consider the alternative allocation
x̂ (t) = x (t̄) + η if t ∈ [t∗ , t̄), x̂ (t) = x (t) otherwise;
p̂ (t) = p̂ if if t ∈ [t∗ , t̄), p̂ (t) = p (t)

otherwise.

The payoff of each seller’s type weakly decreases in this alternative allocation, while the
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buyer’s payoff strictly increases (since c is piecewise continuous and v(t) > c(t) the allocation remains implementable for small η). If the seller’s payoff remains constant, we are
R t̄
done, so assume it decreases by α > 0. There exists ε > 0 such that 0 εdt = α. Thus,
increase all prices by ε, so that the seller’s overall payoff does not change.31 This is incen-

tive compatible and increases the buyer’s payoff. Thus, since the surplus increase goes to
the buyer, it is enough to show that B (t) ≥ 0, all t. Note that the buyer’s ex ante payoff
changes by
∆B (0) =

Z

t̄

(∆x (t) (v (t) − c (t))) dt −

0

=

Z

Z

t̄

(∆p̄ (t) − ∆x (t) c (t)) dt

0

t̄

(∆x (t) (v (t) − c (t))) dt > 0,

0

where ∆x (t) := x′ (t) − x (t̄) and ∆p̄ (t) := p̄′ (t) − p̄ (t). Furthermore,
∆x (t) (v (t) − c (t)) + (∆p̄ (t) − ∆x (t) c (t)) < 0,
if and only if t < t∗∗ ∈ [t∗ , t̄). Thus ∆B (t) ≥ 0 for all t, which completes the argument.
3. x(0) = 1. Suppose towards a contradiction that x (0) < 1. Since the cost function is
piecewise right-continuous and piecewise C 1 we take an interval [0, η] such that (c, v) are
differentiable on that interval. Fix n′ ∈ N such that 1/n′ < η, and consider the following
alternative allocation (xn , p̄n ) defined as
xn (t) := x (t) + (1 − x (0)) if t ∈ [0, n1 ), xn (t) = x (t) otherwise;

p̄n (t) := p̄ (t) + c n1 (1 − x (0)) if t ∈ [0, η), p̄ (t) = p̄ (t) otherwise.

Notice that there exists m > n′ such that this allocation is implementable (and is also a
Pareto improvement for all n > m). If π ∈ ΠV+ , this is a contradiction. If instead π ∈ ΠV−
such that π S > 0, let k > 0 be the supremum of the subgradients of the payoff set at π. Now
31

Notice that the sellers with types [t∗ , t̄) are made worse off, while sellers with types [0, t∗ ) are made better
off. Hence, the allocation (0, 0) is still optimal for types in [t̄, 1) when t̄ < 1.
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R1
notice that for each n the payoff of the buyer increases by (1 − x (0)) 0n (v (s) − c(1/n)) ds,
R1
while the payoff of the seller increases by (1 − x (0)) 0n (c (s) − c(1/n)) ds. Thus the ratio

of the increase in the payoff of the buyer and the seller is arbitrarily large as n → ∞, and
for n large enough, both payoffs can be increased at a rate greater than k, a contradiction.
If π ∈ ΠV− and π s = 0, then either (i) c is constant in a neighborhood of 0, or (ii) c(t) > c(0)
for all t > 0. If (i) holds, then one can readily see that for some small n the alternative
allocation above increases the buyer’s payoff while keeping the seller’s payoff constant. If
(ii) holds, then since c is right-continuous we have π B = 0 and the claim is trivially true.

Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 5 (and finite horizon)
As mentioned, we restrict ourselves to the case of extreme points that lie on the Paretofrontier here. Considering points on the “north-west” and “south-west” of the relevant payoff
set require relatively straightforward modifications.
Lemma 8 Every extreme point (π S , π B ) of the payoff set that can be achieved by veto-incentive
compatible allocations (x, p) ∈ ΠV+ for which π S (0) > v(0) − c(0) can be approached by a regular
allocation.
Proof. Consider an allocation (x, p) satisfying the assumptions of the lemma. This allocation
maximizes the weighted sum of the buyer and the seller payoff. For future reference, let β ∈ (0, 1)
be the seller’s weight. Taking a sufficiently close allocation if necessary, assume that π S (0) ≥
v(0) − c(0) (implicitly we assume that v(0) < v(1− )).32
Define t̂ := sup{t : x(t) > 0}. It is straightforward to construct an allocation (x′ , p′ ) such
that: a) t̂ := sup{t : x′ (t) > 0}; b) x′ (t− ) > 0; c) p′ ≪ v. Since the convex combination of feasible
allocations is also a feasible allocation, take λ ∈ (0, 1) and define (xλ , pλ ) := λ(x, p)+(1−λ)(x′ , p′ )
32

Otherwise the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game is unique and involves the seller selling the good
at v(0) in the first period with probability 1.
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satisfying k(xλ , pλ ) − (x, p)k <

ε
2

and π Sλ (0) > v(0) − c(0). Notice that for the allocation (xλ , pλ )

we have Bλ (0) > 0 for all t < t̂. Furthermore, notice that since (xλ , pλ ) and (c, v) are leftcontinuous the assumptions a) and b) imply that there exists t2 < t̂ such that pλ (s) < v(t2 ) for
all t ∈ (t2 , t̂). Therefore:

Bλ (t2 ) =

Z

t̂

xλ (s) (v(s) − pλ (s)) ds =: ϑ > 0.

t2

Next, we approach the allocation (xλ , pλ ) with a step allocation.

- Step 1: For every n ∈ N we consider a mesh of [0, t̂), Ijn
such that
X
max supt∈Ijn xn (t) − inf t′ ∈Ijn xn (t′ ) <
i)

1
n

j



Mn
j=1


:= [tn1,1 , tn2,1 ), . . . , [tn1,Mn , tn2,Mn )

;



ii) xn (t) = xn (t′ ) for all t ∈ Ijn and xn tn2,j− = xλ tn2,j− for every tn2,j ;



iii) pn (t) = pn (t′ ) for all t ∈ Ijn ; pn tn2,Mn − = p tn2,Mn − and for all j < Mn we define

pn tn2,j− by
pn tn2,j−








xn tn2,j− − c tn2,j− = pn tn2,j+1− xn tn2,j+1− − c tn2,j− ;

iv) All discontinuity points of c belong to the boundaries of the partition.
Notice that for every t we have

p̄n (t) = xn (t)c(t) +

Z

t
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1

xn (s)dc(s).

Notice that by construction xn (t) → x (t) uniformly. Furthermore,

|p̄n (t) − p̄ (t)|
≤ |xn (t)c(t) − x(t)c(t)| +

Z

1

|xn (s) − x(t)| dc(s).

t

Hence, using iv) we conclude that p̄n (t) → p̄ (t) uniformly. Furthermore, there exists n1
such that n > n1 implies Bn (t1 ) ≥ ϑ2 . Hence, the uniform convergence of e p̄n and xn (t)
guarantee that there exists n2 > n1 such that k(xn , pn ) − (xλ , pλ )k <

ε
2

and Bn (t) > 0 for

all t < t̂.
Step 2: Notice that the allocation (xn , pn ) is a step function allocation and hence there are

a finite partition of the types [tn1,1 , tn2,1 ), . . . , [tn1,Mn , tn2,Mn ) such that all types t ∈ [tn1,j , tn2,j )
trade with the same probability. Hence, consider a fictitious game with finite types in
R

v(s)ds
[tn ,tn )
1,j
2,j
which all types t ∈ [tn1,j , tn2,j ) have the same cost c(tn2,j− ), the same value
tn −tn
2,j

1,j

and trade with the same probability. Furthermore, if tn2,j < 1 attribute the cost c(1)

R
[tn ,1) v(s)ds
2,j
to all types t ∈ [tn2,j , 1). In this finite game, consider the
and the value
1−tn
2,j

allocation that maximizes the weighted sum of the buyer’s payoff and the seller’s payoff

(weight β to the seller) such that all types t ∈ [tn1,j , tn2,j ), j ≤ Mn and all types t ∈ [tn2,j , 1)
trade with the same probability. This is a finite dimensional compact problem. Hence, it
admits a solution. Since (xn , pn ) is feasible, the solution leads to a weakly higher value for
the objective function. It is straightforward to show that any solution to this problem is
a regular allocation and, from Theorem 2.1, we know that all downward constraints are
binding and the last type of the seller who trades with positive probability obtains zero
payoff. This completes the proof.
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Finite Horizon
We show below how to implement regular allocations (see Definition 1) when the horizon N
(N ≥ 2) is finite and the players do not discount the future.
- All types make non-serious offers (e.g., pn = v(1) + 1) in every period n < N − 1.
- Types t ∈ [0, t1 ] offer p1 at period N − 1 which is accepted with probability 1.
- For j = 1, . . . , K − 3, sellers with types t ∈ [tj , tj+1 ] make a non-serious offer at period
N −1 and offer pj+1 at period N. The buyer accepts this offer with probability xj+1 . Notice
that it is rational for the buyer to randomize since the buyer breaks even by accepting any
such offer (because B(t1 ) = · · · = B(tK−2) = 0).
K
at period N −1. The buyer accepts this offer with probability
- Types t ∈ [tK−2 , tK ] offer vttK−2

xK−1 β (recall that β is defined in (11)). If this offer is rejected, all types t ∈ [tK−2, tK−1 ]
t

t

K−1
K−1
K
at period N. The offer vtK−2
at period N, while all types t ∈ [tK−1 , tK ] offer vttK−1
offer vtK−2

is accepted with probability ς K−1 , which is defined by xK−1 = xK−1 β + (1 − xK−1 β)ς K−1 ,
K
is accepted with probability ς K , which is defined by xK = xK−1 β +
while the offer vttK−1

(1 − xK−1 β)ς K . Again, it is rational for the buyer to randomize since he breaks even by
accepting any of the offers above.
It is easy to see that the buyer has no profitable deviation. For the seller, we assume that
the buyer puts probability 1 on the seller being type t = 0 (and never revises his belief) after an
off-path offer. Therefore, the best deviation by a seller would be to imitate all types t ∈ [0, t1 ]
and offer p1 at period N − 1. Thus since regular allocations are incentive compatible (see (3) in
Definition 1) we conclude that no type has a profitable deviation.
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Appendix C: Relaxing the Co-Monotonicity of v and c
We have maintained throughout the assumption that both the seller’s cost, and the buyer’s
value are non-decreasing. Of course, there is no loss of generality in assuming that one of these
functions is non-decreasing. So let us assume that types are ordered so that only the cost function
is non-decreasing, and maintain all other assumptions (besides monotonicity). In particular, gains
from trade are bounded away from zero for all t, and, to avoid trivialities, the seller’s highest
cost exceeds the buyer’s average value. Does there exist a similarly tractable characterization of
the veto-incentive compatible program when the value function is not necessarily increasing? In
that case, it is easy to see that B(t) ≥ 0 for all t is no longer a necessary condition, although it
remains a sufficient condition for implementability. This suggests that non-negative correlation
singles out the collection of intervals {[t, 1] : t < 1} as the relevant one for the domains of the
integral constraints B(t). We view it as an important next step to identify what the “right”
collection of intervals is, if any, over which the expected buyer’s payoff must be positive, when
values are not positively correlated, before turning to more general environments with limited
commitment and private information.
In the absence of such a characterization, we might still ask the question: under which conditions is the ex ante efficient (i.e., surplus-maximizing) allocation of the commitment program
also implementable in the veto-incentive program, or even in the bargaining game as frictions
disappear? The answer to this question is surprisingly simple. Recall that the ex ante efficient
mechanism under full commitment takes a very simple form, with (at most) two thresholds t1
and t2 , with 0 < t1 ≤ t2 ≤ 1. If t1 = t2 , it is trivial to implement the allocation in the game,
and, a fortiori, in the veto-incentive compatible program, so let us assume that t2 > t1 . We have
the following necessary and sufficient condition, which generalizes Proposition 1, at the cost of
being stated in terms of endogenous variables (t1 , t2 ).
Proposition 4 If t2 > t1 , the ex ante efficient allocation of the commitment program is imple56

mentable in the bargaining game as δ → 1 if and only if
1
c(t2 ) ≤
t2 − t1

Z

t2

v (t) .
t1

Proof. Sufficiency follows closely the construction in 4.2.3 and is omitted. We focus here on
necessity.
This proof makes clear that the condition is equally necessary for veto-incentive compatibility.
This, this condition is also necessary and sufficient for implementability in the veto-incentive
compatible program. Recall that, in the ex ante efficient allocation, the seller’s expected transfers
p̄ (t) are given by



(1 − x) c (t1 ) + xc (t2 ) t ∈ [0, t1 ) ,



p̄ (t) =
xc (t2 )
t ∈ [t1 , t2 ] ,




 0
t > t2 .

Define the set T̂ as

T̂ := {t ∈ [0, t2 ] : v (t′ ) ≤ v (t) for every t′ ∈ [0, t2 ]} .

Throughout we assume that the set T̂ is nonempty (this is not guaranteed by our assumptions,
and minor adjustments are necessary otherwise). To ease notation, we let v̂ denote the value of
the function v over the set T̂ .
Suppose that c (t2 ) > vtt12 . We want to show that it is impossible to construct a collection of
distributions (µ (· | t))t∈[0,t2 ] over the interval [0, v̂] which satisfy the following three conditions:
i) for every t ∈ [0, t2 ],
Z

v̂

dµ (p | t) = x (t) ,

(15)

pdµ (p | t) = p̄ (t) ,

(16)

0

ii) for every t ∈ [0, t2 ],
Z

v̂

0
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iii) for all p ∈ [0, v̂],
Z

t2

(v (t) − p) dµ (p | t) = 0.

0

(Recall that under the ex ante efficient mechanism the buyer’s expected payoff is equal to zero).
We approximate the function v by a sequence of step functions v n , n ∈ N. In particular, each
v n satisfies
i) for every t ∈ [0, t2 ],
v (t) ≤ v n (t) ≤ v̂,
ii) for every t ∈ [0, 1],
0 ≤ v n (t) − v (t) ≤

1
,
n

iii) if t and t′ belong to the same step of v n , then x (t) = x (t′ ).
Finally, for each n ∈ N, we let I n ⊂ [0, t2 ] denote the union of the intervals over which the
function v n takes the value v̂.
Fix n ∈ N. For each p < v̂ we have
Z

t2

(v n (t) − p) dµ (p | t) = εn (p) ,

0

for some εn (p) ≥ 0. After dividing both sides by v̂ − p and rearranging terms, we have
Z



εn (p)
v̂ − v n (t)
dµ (p | t) =
≥ 0.
dµ (p | t) +
1−
v̂ − p
v̂ − p
t∈I n
t∈[0,t2 ]\I n
Z

We integrate the two sides of the equality over p, and get
n

z :=

Z

t∈I n

Z

0

v̂

dµ (p | t) dt +

Z

t∈[0,t2 ]\I n

Z

0

v̂



v̂ − v n (t)
1−
v̂ − p



dµ (p | t) dt ≥ 0.

For each t ∈ [0, t2 ] \I n , let µ̄ (· | t) denote the distribution that assigns probability x (t) to the
offer p̄ (t) /x (t) (with probability 1 − x (t) no offer is made). Notice that the function
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1
p−v̂

is

concave in p. This, together with conditions (15) and (16), implies that, for each n ∈ N,
n

z̄ :=

Z

t∈I n

Z

v̂

dµ̄ (p | t) dt +

Z

t∈[0,1]\I n

0

Z

0

v̂



v̂ − v n (t)
dµ̄ (p | t) dt ≥ tz n ≥ 0.
1−
v̂ − p

(17)

We take the limit of z̄ n as n goes to infinity, so that
R t1

(v̂−v(t))dt
v̂−(1−x)c(t1 )−xc(t2 )

n

z̄ := limn→∞ z̄ = t1 + (t2 − t1 ) x −
t

t

t1 (v01 −(1−x)c(t1 )−xc(t2 ))
v̂−(1−x)c(t1 )−xc(t2 )

−

x(t2 −t1 )(c(t2 )−vt 2 )
1
v̂−c(t2 )

0

−x

R t2
t1

(v̂−v(t))dt
v̂−c(t2 )

t

<

=
t

t1 (v01 −(1−x)c(t1 )−xc(t2 ))−x(t2 −t1 )(c(t2 )−vt 2 )
1
v̂−(1−x)c(t1 )−xc(t2 )

= 0,

where the inequality follows from the fact that c (t2 ) > vtt12 , and the last equality follows from the
definition of x in equation (6). However, z̄ being strictly negative contradicts the fact that it is
the limit of a sequence of nonnegative numbers (see condition (17)).

Appendix D: A Sufficient Condition for the Efficient Mechanism to be
Implemented in the Bargaining Game
Recall that Y : [0, 1] → R is defined as

Y (t) :=

Z

t

(v (s) − c (t)) ds =
0

Z

t

(v (s) − c (s) − sc′ (s)) ds.

0

Our assumptions imply that, as mentioned, Y (0) = 0, Y ′ (0) > 0 (if v > c) and Y (1) < 0.
Let t denote the smallest local maximizer of the function Y . Also, let t̄ denote the smallest
strictly positive root of Y . For any t let µ (t) denote the mechanism under which the types below
t trade with probability one at the price c (t) and the types above t do not trade. Notice that if
Y (t) ≥ 0, then the mechanism µ (t) is incentive compatible and individually rational.
Consider the efficient mechanism under full commitment. We know that there exist 0 < t1 ≤
t2 ≤ 1 such that the seller’s types in [0, t1 ) trade with probability 1, while the types in [t1 , t2 ]
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trade with probability x (t1 , t2 ) ∈ [0, 1) (all other types of the seller do not trade). Recall that
the buyer’s individual rationality constraint holds with equality. Thus, we have


R t1

R t2



(v (s) − c (t1 )) ds + x t1 c (t1 ) + t1 v (s) ds − t2 c (t2 ) =
R t2
Y (t1 ) + x t1 (v (s) − c (s) − sc′ (s)) ds = Y (t1 ) + x (Y (t2 ) − Y (t1 )) .
0=

0

Therefore, we can express x (t1 , t2 ) as

x (t1 , t2 ) =

Y (t1 )
.
Y (t1 ) − Y (t2 )

Consider the case in which t2 > t1 , i.e., there is a set of types who trade with a probability
larger than zero but smaller than one. First, we must have Y (t2 ) − Y (t1 ) < 0, otherwise we
may increase x and improve efficiency. This immediately implies Y (t1 ) > 0. Second, under the
optimal mechanism Y (t2 ) < 0. In fact, if Y (t2 ) ≥ 0, it is possible to implement the mechanism
µ (t2 ), which is more efficient than the original one. In particular, this implies that t2 > t̄.
Finally, we must have t1 ≥ t. Suppose that t1 < t. Fix t2 of the original mechanism and
choose t′1 ∈ (t1 , t]. Consider the mechanism under which the types in [0, t′1 ) trade with probability
1 while the types in [t′1 , t2 ] trade with probability
x (t′1 , t2 )

Y (t′1 )
Y (t1 )
=
>
= x (t1 , t2 ) ,
′
Y (t1 ) − Y (t2 )
Y (t1 ) − Y (t2 )

where the inequality follows from Y (t′1 ) > Y (t1 ) and Y (t2 ) < 0. Of course, the new mechanism is
more efficient than the original one since the types in [t1 , t2 ] trade with a larger probability while
the types outside this interval trade with the same probability as under the original mechanism.
We summarize our results:
Fact 5 Let t1 and t2 denote the endpoints of the first two steps of the optimal mechanism. Then
t1 ≥ t, and t2 ≥ t̄.
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We are now ready to provide a sufficient condition to implement the efficient mechanism in
the bargaining game (when the players are sufficiently patient).
Condition 6 For any t ≥ t̄
t

Z

(v (s) − c (t)) ds ≥ 0.

t

We now explain why the above condition is sufficient. Fix 0 < t̃ ≤ 1, and consider the
 
function ϕ : 0, t̃ → R given by
ϕ (t) :=

Z

t̃
t


v (s) − c t̃ ds.


Under our assumptions, if ϕ (t′ ) ≥ 0 for some t′ , then ϕ (t) > 0 for every t ∈ t′ , t̃ . Recall that
 

the function v is increasing. Let t′′ denote the value in 0, t̃ such that v (t′′ ) = c t̃ (let t′′ = t̃


if v t̃ < c t̃ ). The function ϕ is increasing [0, t′′ ]. By definition, ϕ is positive above t′′ .
Therefore, fix t2 ≥ t̄. Our condition guarantees that for each t1 ∈ [t, t2 ],
Z

t2

(v (s) − c (t2 )) ds ≥ 0,

t1

which implies the result, by Proposition 1.

Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 3 (Sketch)
This appendix sketches the proofs of the two harder statements in Proposition 3. We first
show that the set of allocations in the buyer veto-incentive compatible program is the same
whether or not one imposes ex post seller individual rationality. We then show that, as far as
payoffs are concerned, the latter requirement can even be strengthened to seller veto-incentive
compatibility. In both cases, for simplicity, we restrict attention to finite types. The extension
to our set-up with a continuum of types follows by standard limiting arguments.
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Lemma 9 Assume that c and v are step functions with n steps such that c1 < c2 < · · · < cN ,
and (x, p) is an allocation that is implementable in the veto-incentive compatible program. Then
there exists a measure µ which induce this allocation such that, for all t ∈ T , we have
Z

µ (t) [1, dp] = 0.
[0,c(t))

Proof. Since (c, v) are step functions we can consider the model with N types in which the
probability of each type is qi . We write {µi }N
i=1 for the distribution of offers faced by type i.
Step 1: We divide the type space into 3 subsets:

T1 := {i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : pi > vi } ,
T2 := {i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : pi < vi } ,
T3 := {i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : pi = vi } .

Step 2: For k ≤ j, define
Ljk

:=

j
X

qi (xi (vi − pi )) .

i=k

∗
i
Step 3: Notice that LN
0 = B (0) ≥ 0, and let J be the lowest type i such that L0 ≥ 0.

Here we show how to construct an allocation satisfying the properties above for the special case
that J ∗ = N > 1. The general proof considers a partition of the type space {1, . . . , i1 }, {i1 +
1, . . . , i2 }, . . . , {iK + 1, . . . , N} and applies this procedure to each set separately.
Step 4: We will present an algorithm which delivers the desired result.
Step 4.1: Let k1 be the smallest element in T2 .
There are 2 cases to consider:
Case 1:
q1 x1 (v1 − p1 ) + qk1 xk1 (vk1 − pk1 ) < 0.
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Case 2:
q1 x1 (v1 − p1 ) + qk1 xk1 (vk1 − pk1 ) ≥ 0.
Case 1: Notice that since k1 > 1, we have pk1 ≥ p1 . From type k1 ’s individual rationality
constraint, we have pk1 ≥ ck1 . Also, there exists λ ∈ (0, 1) such that

λq1 x1 (v1 − p1 ) + qk1 xk1 (vk1 − pk1 ) = 0.

(18)

p1 = αpk1 + (1 − α) v1 ,

(19)

Next, notice that

for some α ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, applying (19) into (18) we have

0 = λq1 x1 (1 − α) (v1 − v1 ) + λq1 x1 α (v1 − pk1 ) + qk1 xk1 (vk1 − pk1 ) .
Next, we use (20) to show that x = x1 + x̂1 , where



λx1 if i = 1,



x1i :=
xk1 if i = k1 ,




 0 otherwise,

N

and x̂1 := x − x1 ≥ 0. For the allocation (x1 , p), we construct a measure {µ1i }i=1 such that:
a.

R

dµ1 ,

R


pdµ1 = (x1 , p);

b. If x1i > 0 then µ1i [0, ci ) = 0.
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(20)

For that, we define µ1i := 0 if i ∈
/ {1, k1 } and

µ11 (p̃) :=








λx1 α if p̃ = pk1

λx1 (1 − α) if p̃ = v1





0 otherwise



 xk if p̃ = pk ,
1
1
1
µk1 (p̃) :=

 0 otherwise.

Case 2: There exists (ζ, γ) ∈ (0, 1] × (0, 1] such that

p1 = ζpk1 + (1 − ζ) v1 ,
0 = q1 x1 (1 − ζ) (v1 − v1 ) + q1 x1 ζ (v1 − pk1 ) + γqk1 xk1 (vk1 − pk1 ) .

Thus, we define
x1i :=








x1 if i = 1,

γxk1 if i = k1 ,




 0 otherwise,

N

and x̂1 := x−x1 ≥ 0. For the allocation (x1 , p), we construct measures {µ1i }i=1 by setting µ1i := 0
if i ∈
/ {1, k1 } and

µ11 (p̃) :=













x1 ζ if p̃ = pk1
x1 (1 − ζ) if p = v1

Step 4.2: Assume that x =
Case i.
Case ii.

0 otherwise
PM

i=1

µ1k1 (p̃) =



 γxk if p̃ = pk ,
1
1

 0 otherwise.

xi + x̂M . There are two possibilities:


i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : x̂M
i > 0 ∩ T1 6= ∅.


i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : x̂M
i > 0 ⊆ T2 ∪ T3 .

−1
Assume that x̂M
is such that
i

if J < N. We claim:

PN

i=1 qi



P
−1
−1
x̂M
(vi − pi ) ≥ 0 and Ji=1 qi x̂M
(vi − pi ) < 0
i
i
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−1
−1
M
Claim 7 If Step 4.1 is applied to x̂M
, x̂M
= xM
with i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : x̂M
i + x̂i
i > 0 ∩
i
i


PN
P
J
M
T1 6= ∅, then i=1 qi x̂M
i (vi − pi ) ≥ 0 and
i=1 qi x̂i (vi − pi ) < 0 if J < N.


 PN
M −1
M
q
x̂
(v
−
p
)
. For
q
x̂
(v
−
p
)
=
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i=1
i=1

−1
be the largest element of i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : x̂M
> 0 ∩ T2 . There are two
i

Proof: The first conclusion follows since
the second, let kM −1
possibilities:

PN

a. J < kM −1 ≤ N. In this case, the result is immediate.
b. kM −1 ≤ J < N. In this case,

0 >

X

−1
qi x̂M
(vi − pi )
i

i≤J

=

X
i≤J

=

X



 X
−1
qi x̂M
(v
−
p
)
+
qi
i
i
i
i≤N

qi x̂M
i



(vi − pi ) ,

i≤J



M −1
x̂M
(vi − pi )
i − x̂i

where we used the fact that kM −1 ≤ J implies

0=

X
i≤N

qi


 X
M −1
x̂M
(vi − pi ) =
qi
i − x̂i
i≤J



M −1
x̂M
(vi − pi ) .
i − x̂i


 +1
M +1
and x̂M +1 and µM
From Claim 7, we can apply Step 4.1 into x̂M
i to obtain x
i

N
i=1

such that:
a’.

R

dµM +1 ,

R


pdµM +1 = (xM +1 , p);

+1
+1
b’. If xM
> 0 then µM
[0, ci ) = 0.
i
i

Notice that this procedure can take (at most) N − 1 rounds. In order to complete the Lemma
we move to Case ii.
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 +1
Case ii: In this case, define µM
i

N
i=1

by:



 x̂M if p̃ = pi
i
M +1
µi
(p̃) :=

 0 otherwise.

Step 5: Assume the algorithm described in Step 4.1 and Step 4.2 was applied to the
K
X
allocation x such that x =
xj + x̂k . Thus it is straightforward to verify that the measure
{µi }N
i=1 defined by µi (p̃) :=

j=1
K+1
X

µji (p̃) is such that (x, p) =

j=1

completes the proof.

R


R
dµ, pdµ and µi [0, ci ) = 0. This

We now turn to the other nontrivial claim: seller veto-incentive compatibility does not restrict
the set of payoffs that can be achieved in the buyer veto-incentive compatible program. Here as
well, attention is restricted to finite types.

Lemma 10 Assume that the type space is finite and let π B , π S be a vertex of the payoff frontier

achieved in the (buyer) veto-incentive compatible program. There exists a seller veto-incentive
compatible measure µ = {µi }N
i=1 that achieves this payoff.

Proof. Assume that there are N types.33 It can be shown that if π B , π S is a vertex of the

payoff frontier then it achieved by an allocation (x, p) for which there exists a partition of the
34
type space: {Pj }K
j=1 with P1 = {1, . . . , i1 } and Pj = {ij−1 + 1, . . . , ij }, with iK ≥ 1 such that:

i. If j < K, then if i, i′ ∈ Pj we have pi = pi′ = E [v | Pj ].
ii. If j = K, then we have either a. or b. below:
a. (pi , xi ) = (pN , xN ) for all i ∈ PK ;
33
34

For simplicity of exposition we assume that all types trade with positive probability.
A proof is available upon request.
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b. PK = I1 ∪ I2 where I1 = {ik−1 + 1, . . . , il } and I2 = {il + 1, . . . , N} with ik−1 ≤
il < N is such that (pi , xi ) = (p′ , x′ ) if i ∈ I1 and (pi , xi ) = (p′′ , x′′ ) if i ∈ I2 with
cil ≤ E [v | i ∈ I1 ] and p′ < p′′ .
Here, we prove the more challenging case b.
Step 1: Defining µi for i ∈
/ PK by:


 xi if p̃ = pi ,
µi (p̃) :=

 0 otherwise.

Step 2: To define µi for i ∈ PK , there are two cases to consider:
Case 1: p′ ≤ E [v | i ∈ I1 ].
In this case we let

µi (p̃) :=



 x′ if p̃ = p′ and i ∈ I1

µi (p̃) =


 0 if p̃ 6= p′ and i ∈ I1



 x′′ if p̃ = p′′ and i ∈ I2 ,

 0 if p̃ 6= p′′ and i ∈ I2 .

It is straightforward to check that µ is veto-incentive compatible for the seller.
Case 2: p′ > E [v | i ∈ I1 ].

In this case, notice that since the allocation is incentive compatible we must have

Bik−1 +1 =

X

qi xi (vi − pi ) ≥ 0,

(21)

i≥ik−1 +1

Furthermore, because p′ ∈ (E [v | i ∈ I1 ] , p′′ ), there exists α ∈ (0, 1) such that
p′ = αE [v | i ∈ I1 ] + (1 − α) p′′ .
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(22)

Thus, notice that from (21) and (22),
X

0 ≤

qi xi (vi − pi ) +

=

qi xi (vi − p′′ )

i∈I2

i∈I1

X

X

αqi xi (vi − E [v | i ∈ I1 ])

i∈I1

+

X

(1 − α) qi xi (vi − p′′ ) +

P

i∈I1

(1 − α) qi xi (vi − p′′ ) +

Therefore, we define µi by

qi xi (vi − p′′ ) .

i∈I2

i∈I1

Thus,

X

P

i∈I2

qi xi (vi − p′′ ) = Bik−1 +1 ≥ 0.




αx′ if p̃ = E [v | i ∈ I1 ] and i ∈ I1



µi (p̃) :=
(1 − α) x′ if p̃ = p′′ and i ∈ I1





0 if p̃ ∈
/ {p′ , p′′ } and i ∈ I1

µi (p̃) :=



 x′′ if p̃ = p′′ and i ∈ I2 ,

 0 if p̃ 6= p′′ and i ∈ I2 .

It is straightforward to verify that the allocation constructed is veto-incentive compatible for
the seller. This completes the proof.

Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose towards a contradiction that there exists an equilibrium allocation which violates
veto-incentive compatibility. Therefore, there exists η > 0 and t̃ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Z

t̃

∞
1X
n=0



δ n Eσ∗ (v(s) − p(s)) 1ξn | s ds ≤ −η,

(23)

where ξ n is defined as the event reflecting the object being sold at period n and 1ξn is its the
indicator function. Consider a typical history in which an offer is made at n, h̃n . h̃n includes: i)
all previous offers (as well as the identity of the proposer) before period n; ii) The player who
makes an offer at n; iii) the offer made at period n. Given an on-path history h̃n , we let µh̃n be
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the associated distribution of types. Since limn→∞ δ n = 0 there exists N ≥ 1 such that for all
n ≥ N we have:
Z

t̃

∞
1 X

n=N



δ n Eσ∗ (v(s) − p(s)) 1ξn | s dµh̃n > −η.

(24)
∗

Therefore, let N ∗ be the largest integer for which there is an on-path history h̃N such that
Z

t̃

∞
X

1

n=N ∗



δ n Eσ∗ (v(s) − p(s)) 1ξn | s dµh̃N ∗ ≤ −η,

∗

(25)

∗

and consider a history h̃N satisfying (25). Let p be the offer made by the seller at h̃N and
notice that from the definition of N ∗ we have
Z

1



δ n Eσ∗ (v(s) − p) 1ξn | s dµh̃N ∗ < 0.

t̃

(26)

There are two cases:
∗

Case 1: The seller is selected to make an offer in period T at h̃N .
From (26) the buyer accepts such an offer with positive probability. Since v(·) is an increasing
function (26) implies
Z

1
0



δ n Eσ∗ (v(s) − p) 1ξn | s dµh̃N ∗ < 0,

which shows that the buyer could have profitably deviated by rejecting p, offering 0 in every
future period and rejecting every future offer.
∗

Case 2: The buyer is selected to make an offer in period n at h̃N .
Let A ⊂ [0, t̃] be the set of types who accept this offer with probability 1. There are two
possibilities.
Possibility 1: µh̃N ∗ (A) = µh̃N ∗ ([0, t̃]).
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∗

In this case, the expected payoff of the buyer at h̃N is:
Z
=

Z

≤

Z

t̃

∞
X

0 n=N ∗
t̃
0

t̃





δn Eσ ∗ (v(s) − p(s)) 1ξn | s dµh̃ +



δ n Eσ∗ (v(s) − p(s)) 1ξn | s dµh̃N ∗ +

∞
1 X

n=N ∗

N∗

Z

t̃

1

Z

1

t̃

∞
X

n=N ∗

∞
X

n=N ∗



δ n Eσ∗ (v(s) − p(s)) 1ξn | s dµh̃N ∗



δ n Eσ∗ (v(s) − p(s)) 1ξn | s dµh̃N ∗



δ n Eσ∗ (v(s) − p(s)) 1ξn | s dµh̃N ∗ < 0

(27)

where we have used the fact that v(·) is monotonic to conclude from (25) that the first term in
the second line of (27) is nonpositive. Thus the buyer obtains a negative continuation payoff at
∗

h̃N , a contradiction.
Possibility 2: µh̃N ∗ (A) < µh̃N ∗ ([0, t̃]).
In this case, the types [0, t̃]/A reject the offer. From (25) we know that a positive measure
of sellers with types in [0, t̃] accept this offer. Thus since c is monotonic we conclude that all
types in [0, t̃]/A are indifferent between accepting this offer or not. One can easily show that if
all types [0, t̃]/A were to accept this offer the buyer would be weakly better off. Therefore, it
∗

follows from (27) that the buyer obtains a negative continuation payoff at h̃N , a contradiction.

Appendix G: Details for Samuelson’s Example 1
Notice that E (v) = 21 k + ∆. If k ≥ 2, then E (v) ≥ 1 = c (1) for every ∆ ≥ 0. In words, for
any k ≥ 2 and every ∆ ≥ 0, the first best is implementable in the veto IC program.
Similarly, if k ∈ [0, 2) and ∆ ≥ 1 − 21 k, then the first best is implementable in the veto IC
program.
In what follows, let us restrict attention to the set of pairs (k, ∆) with 0 ≤ k < 2 and
1
max {0, 1 − k} < ∆ < 1 − k.
2
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Consider the function
g (k) =

4
− k.
4−k

Notice that g is strictly decreasing in [0, 2) and
1
max {0, 1 − k} < g (k) < 1 − k
2
for every k ∈ (0, 2) (the three quantities coincide for k = 0).



Claim 8 Fix k ∈ (0, 2) . If ∆ ∈ g (k) , 1 − 12 k , then condition (9) is satisfied.
This means that if ∆ ≥ g (k) , then the most efficient outcome of the full commitment
program is implementable in the veto IC program (recall that if ∆ ≥ 1 − 12 k, then the first best


is implementable). When ∆ belongs to the nonempty set g (k) , 1 − 21 k , the first best is not

implementable in the full commitment program. However, the second best is implementable in
the veto IC program.
Proof of the Claim
The function Y (t) is given by

Y (t) =

Z

0

t

1
(ks + ∆ − t) ds = t (2∆ − 2t + kt) .
2

Let t and t̄ denote the smallest local maximizer and the smallest strictly positive root of Y,
respectively. We have
t=

∆
,
2−k

t̄ =
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2∆
.
2−k

Condition (9) becomes: For every t ≥

Z (t) =
=

Z

2∆
,
2−k

t

(ks + ∆ − t) ds
∆
2−k


1
3 2
2 2
2
2
2
2
2
≥ 0.
2 k t − 6k t + 2k t∆ + 12kt − 10kt∆ + k∆ − 8t + 12t∆ − 4∆
2 (k − 2)

For every k ∈ [0, 2) , Z is concave in t. Therefore, it is enough to check that Condition (9)
holds at the extremes,

2∆
2−k

and 1. We have

Z
Z (1) =

1
2(k−2)2

2∆
2−k



2

∆
= 12 k (k−2)
2,

(k 3 + 2k 2 ∆ − 6k 2 + k∆2 − 10k∆ + 12k − 4∆2 + 12∆ − 8) .

For every k ∈ [0, 2) , Z (1) is concave in ∆. Consider the expression

k 3 + 2k 2 ∆ − 6k 2 + k∆2 − 10k∆ + 12k − 4∆2 + 12∆ − 8 .
The roots are
g (k) =

4
4−k

− k, 2 − k.



Therefore, if ∆ ∈ g (k) , 1 − 21 k , then Z (1) ≥ 0 and Condition (9) is satisfied.

Appendix H: Markov Equilibria
In this appendix, we show that, at least in the case of finitely (but arbitrarily) many types,
restricting attention to Markov perfect equilibria does not restrict the set of limit equilibrium
payoffs that we characterize in the bargaining game. A Markovian strategy is a strategy that
only depends on the (public) belief about the seller’s type. An equilibrium is Markov perfect if
it involves Markovian strategies.
We assume that there are N types: T := {t1 , . . . , tN } and that c and v are strictly monotone
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in t. Let qi be the probability of type ti .
We claim that any regular allocation (x, p) can be approximately implemented by Markov
strategies when the parties are patient. In a regular allocation, there is a monotone partition
of the type space {T1 , . . . , TM }. We focus on the case in which all types trade with positive
probability and in which M > 3 (the other cases are analogous). For every k ∈ {1, . . . , M},
types t ∈ Tk trade with probability xk at a price pk . Notice that 1 = x1 > · · · > xM and
v(t1 ) ≤ p1 < · · · < pM . For every k ∈ {1, . . . , M}, let i(k) := min{i : ti ∈ Tk } and j(k) :=
max{i : ti ∈ Tk }. Define tk = ti(k) and t̄k := tj(k) . We have: B(t1 ) ≥ 0, B(tk ) = 0 for every
k < M and B(tM ) > 0. Furthermore, all local incentive constraints bind.
For each k ∈ {1, . . . , M} define
P
t∈T qi v(ti )
v (Tk ) := P k
.
t∈Tk qi
Take ε > 0. For (close enough to one) δ we specify a Markovian equilibrium that implements
the allocation (xδ , pδ ). The family of allocations (xδ , pδ ) satisfy limδ↑1 (xδ , pδ ) − (x, p) < ε.
Step 1: Defining an implementable allocation (x′ , p′ ) close to (x, p) which satisfies additional
properties.
Using the fact that c is strictly monotone and all local incentive constraints bind in (x, p), it
is straightforward to construct an allocation (x′ , p′ ) such that:
a) Every type t ∈ Tk trades with the same probability and with the same price. The allocation
is monotonic satisfies x′1 = 1 and p1 ≥ v(t1 ).
b) B(t1 ) ≥ 0, B(tk ) = 0 for every k < M and B(tM ) > 0.
c) For every k ∈ {1, . . . , M − 3} , the type t̄k strictly prefer (x′k , p′k ) to (x′k+1 , p′k+1).
d) For every k ∈ {M − 2, M − 1} , the type t̄k is indifferent between (x′k , p′k ) to (x′k+1 , p′k+1 ).
e) Type tM obtains a strictly positive payoff: xM (pM − c(tM )) > 0.
f) It holds that k(x′ , p′ ) − (x, p)k < 2ε .
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With some abuse of notation we assume that the original allocation (x, p) satisfies a)–f).
Step 2: Constructing a Markovian equilibrium.
The construction is divided into steps (1)–(7).
(1) All types t ∈ T1 make an offer p1 at n = 0. The buyer accepts this offer with probability
1.
(2) Consider types t ∈ Tk for 1 < k < M − 2. All such types offer pk in every period n ≥ 0.
The buyer randomizes and accepts this offer with probability ψ δk in each period. We set ψ δk such
that:
xk =

ψ δk

+ δ(1 −

ψ δk )ψ δk

+··· =



ψ δk
1 − δ(1 − ψ δk )



.

(28)

(3) Consider types t ∈ TM −2 . For each small η > 0 let

p

M −2

(η) :=

P

ti ∈TM −2 /{t̄M −2 } qi v(ti )

P

+ qj(M −2) v(t̄M −2 )(1 − η)

ti ∈TM −2 /{t̄M −2 } qi

+ qj(M −2) (1 − η)

.

(29)

That is, assume that a measure ηqj(M −2) of the type t̄M −2 “leaves” the partition TM −2 . Thus,
pM −2 (η) is the expected value to the buyer from this new set. Notice that since M > 3, we have
B(tM −2 ) = B(tM −1 ) = 0 and hence pM −2 = v (TM −2 ). Consequently, we have limη→0 pM −2 (η) =
pM −2 .

All types ti ∈ TM −2 / t̄M −2 offer pM −2 (η) in every period n ≥ 0. The type t̄M −2 randomizes.

With probability (1−η), he “joins” this partition and offers pM −2 (η) in every period n ≥ 0. With
complementary probability his behavior is determined in point (4) below. The probability that
the offer pM −2 (η) is accepted in each period, ψ δM −2 , is set to yield the payoff xM −2 (pM −2 −c(t̄M −2 ))
to type t̄M −2 :
xM −2 (pM −2 − c(t̄M −2 )) =

ψ δM −2
1 − δ(1 − ψ δM −2 )
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!


pM −2 (η) − c(t̄M −2 ) .

(30)

δ

For future reference, let ψ̄ M −2 solve:
δ

xM −2 (pM −2 − c(t̄M −2 )) =

ψ̄ M −2
1 − δ(1 −

δ
ψ̄ M −2 )

!


v(t̄M −2 ) − c(t̄M −2 ) ,

(31)


δ
and notice that ψ̄ M −2 < ψ δM −2 if and only if TM −2 \ t̄M −2 6= ∅.

(4) Next, we specify the behavior of the remaining types. Remember that B(tM −1 ) = 0 and

B(tM ) > 0 and hence pM −1 > v(TM −1 ). Therefore, there is a unique β ∈ (0, 1) such that:

xM −1 pM −1 = βxM −1 v(TM −1 ) + (1 − β)xM −1 v(TM −1 ∪ TM ).

At period n = 0, all types t ∈ TM −2 ∪ TM −1 together with a measure

−1,M −2
pM
:=
0

P

M −2
)
ti ∈TM −2 ∪TM −1 qi v(ti ) + qj(M −2) v(t̄

P
η
ti ∈TM −2 ∪TM −1 qi + qj(M −2) 2

η
2
η
2





(32)

of type t̄M −2 offer

.

(33)

The buyer accepts this offer with probability ψ δ0 . This probability is set such that the type
t̄M −2 is indifferent between:
a) Offering v(t̄M −2 ) in every future period. In this case, the buyer randomizes and accepts
δ

this offer with probability ψ̄ M −2 (see (31)) the type t̄M −2 obtains a payoff xM −2 (pM −2 − c(t̄M −2 )).
−1,M −2
b) Offering pM
for one period. If the buyer rejects it (which happens with probability
0

(1 − ψ δ0 )) the seller reverts to strategy a) in the next period.

A measure η2 of type t̄M −2 chooses b).
Inductively, we define

−1,M −2
pM
n

:=

P

qi v(ti ) + qj(M −2) v(t̄M −2 )

P
η
q
+
q
n+1
i
j(M
−2)
ti ∈TM −2 ∪TM −1
2

ti ∈TM −2 ∪TM −1

η
2n+1



,

(34)

and define ψ δn analogously for all n ≤ n∗ (n∗ is defined below). Notice that the total discounted
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probability that the buyer purchases the good in periods n = 0, . . . , n∗ is:

Xnδ ∗ := ψ δ0 + δ(1 − ψ δ0 )ψ δ1 + · · · + δ

n∗

"n∗ −1
#
Y
(1 − ψ δn ) ψ δn∗ .

(35)

n=0

Next, define n∗ as the minimum integer n such that Xnδ ≥ (1 − β)xM −1 (see (32)). It is
straightforward to show that the difference Xnδ ∗ − (1 − β)xM −1 → 0 as δ ↑ 1 and η → 0. Below
we define the continuation behavior after n∗ .
The type t̄M −2 offers v(t̄M −2 ) in every future period (and this offer is accepted with probability
δ

ψ̄ M −2 ).
All types t ∈ TM −1 offer v(TM −1 ). This offer is accepted with constant probability ψ δM −1 in
every future period. ψ δM −1 is set such that to make type t̄M −2 indifferent:
δ

ψ̄ M −2
δ

1 − δ(1 − ψ̄ M −2 )

!

ψ δM −1
1 − δ(1 − ψ δM −1 )

v(t̄M −2 ) − c(t̄M −2 ) =


!


v(TM −1 ) − c(t̄M −2 ) . (36)

All types t ∈ TM offer v(TM ). This offer is accepted with constant probability ψ δM in every
future period. ψ δM is set to make type t̄M −1 indifferent:
ψ δM −1
1 − δ(1 − ψ δM −1 )

!

M −1

v(TM −1 ) − c(t̄



) =



ψ δM
1 − δ(1 − ψ δM )




v(TM ) − c(t̄M −2 ) .

(37)

Next, we explain in (5) why the induced allocation (xδ , pδ ) is close to (x, p) when η is small
and δ large. Then we verify in (6) that the induced allocation is indeed an equilibrium when
when η is small and δ large. In (7) we show that the equilibrium is Markovian.
(5) It is clear that for all k < M − 1 all t ∈ Tk trade with probability xδ (t) close to x(t) and
at a price pδ (t) close to p(t) (when η is small and δ large). Next, we consider types t ∈ TM −1 .
From (36) the type t̄M −2 is indifferent between the allocation (xδ (t), pδ (t)) and always imitating
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types t ∈ TM −1 . Therefore, using (30) and (36) we obtain:
xM −2 (pM −2 − c(t̄M −2 ))
(38)
"n∗ −1
#




Y
−1,M −2
M −1,M −2
δ
δ
n∗
M −2
M −2
(1
−
ψ
)
ψ
= ψδ0 pM
−
c(
t̄
)
+
·
·
·
+
δ
p
−
c(
t̄
)
∗
∗
n
n
n
0
n=0

+δ

n∗ +1

n∗
Y

(1 − ψ δn )

n=0

!

ψ δM −1
1 − δ(1 − ψ δM −1 )

!


v(TM −1 ) − c(t̄M −2 ) .

−1,M −2
Next, notice that as η → 0 we have pM
→ v(TM −1 ∪ TM ) and as δ ↑ 1 we have
n∗

Xnδ ∗ − (1 − β)xM −1 → 0. Therefore, for any κ > 0 we can find η 1 > 0 and δ 1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
whenever η < η 1 and δ > δ 1 we have:


∗
−1,M −2
M −2
−
c(
t̄
)
+ · · · + δn
ψ δ0 pM
0

"n∗ −1
Y
n=0

#



(1 − ψ δn ) ψ δn∗ pnM∗−1,M −2 − c(t̄M −2 )

< κ.

−(1 − β)xM −1 v(TM −1 ∪ TM )
Thus, for such parameters we have
xM −2 (pM −2 − c(t̄M −2 ))

(39)

= (1 − β)xM −1 (v(TM −1 ∪ TM ) − c(t̄M −2 ))
!
!
n∗
Y

ψ δM −1
n∗ +1
δ
M −2
v(T
)
−
c(
t̄
)
+ zδ ,
+δ
(1 − ψ n )
M
−1
δ
1
−
δ(1
−
ψ
)
M −1
n=0
where z δ ≤ |κ|. Next, using (32) and the fact that type t̄M −2 is indifferent between the allocations
(xM −2 , pM −2) and (xM −1 , pM −1 ), we have
xM −2 (pM −2 − c(t̄M −2 ))

(40)

= βxM −1 (v(TM −1 ) − c(t̄M −2 )) + (1 − β) xM −1 (v(TM −1 ∪ TM ) − c(t̄M −2 )).
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From (39) and (40) we immediately have:
βxM −1 (v(TM −1 ) − c(t̄M −2 ))
!
!
n∗
δ
Y

ψ
∗
M
−1
M −2
v(T
)
−
c(
t̄
)
+ zδ ,
= δ n +1
(1 − ψ δn )
M
−1
δ
1
−
δ(1
−
ψ
)
M −1
n=0
∗

n∗ +1

n
Y

(1 − ψ δn )

!



ψδM −1
1−δ(1−ψ δM −1 )



→ βxM −1 . Using a similar argument we
n=0

conclude that for all t ∈ TM the allocation xδ (t), pδ (t) can be made as close as we want to
which implies that δ

(x(t), p(t)) by taking η is small and δ close to 1.

(6) We show that the induced allocation is indeed an equilibrium.
We start defining the off-path behavior. First, consider a deviation by the buyer. The only
off-path action is to reject the offer p1 at n = 0 (as the buyer should randomize over all other
offers). If the buyer rejects p1 at n = 0, the equilibrium specifies that the buyer does not
update his belief and accepts the same offer with probability 1 in the next period. Following this
deviation, the equilibrium prescribes that seller makes the same offer in the subsequent period.
If the seller deviates and do not offer p1 the continuation equilibrium is the same as the one
triggered by an off-path offer made by the seller (see below).
Now, consider an off-path deviation by the seller. First, assume that the seller makes an offpath offer. In this case, we impose that the buyer puts probability 1 on the seller being type t1
and he never revises his belief again. The buyer accepts any future offer p if and only if p ≤ v(t1 ).
Type ti offers v(t1 ) if (v(t1 ) − c(ti )) ≥ 0 and v(tM ) + 1 otherwise. Therefore, he guarantees a
payoff [v(t1 ) − c(ti )]+ . We postpone the description of the seller’s continuation strategy after a
deviation to an offer which is made on the equilibrium path to the end of (6).
Now, we show that the buyer does not have a profitable deviation. Notice that since B(t1 ) ≥ 0
and B(t2 ) = 0 we have v(T1 ) ≥ p1 and hence the buyer would never profit by rejecting the offer
p1 . Next, notice that the buyer obtains zero payoffs from all other (on-path) offers and hence he
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cannot profitably deviate by accepting or rejecting any such offer with probability 1. Finally,
consider the buyer off-path behavior induced by a seller deviation. In this case, the buyer puts
probability 1 on the seller having type t1 . Since no offer lower than v(t1 ) will ever be made, it is
evident that the strategy of accepting an offer p if and only if p ≤ v(t1 ) is optimal.
Let us now show that the seller has no profitable deviation.
First, consider a seller with a type t < t̄M −2 and assume that t ∈ Tk . Let us first contemplate
the deviation to some offer pj ∈ {p1 , . . . , pM −3 } \ {pk } in the first period. Notice that since the
buyer’s acceptance rate is constant we may (w.l.o.g.) assume that the seller offers pj in every
subsequent period. Since the allocation (x, p) is monotonic and incentive compatible, (28) implies
that there is no profitable deviation.
Next, let us consider a deviation to the offer pM −2 (η) at n = 0 (thus assume implicitly that k <
M − 2). Notice that we have assumed in (c) in Step 1 that type t̄M −3 strictly prefer (xM −3 , pM −3 )
to (xM −2 , pM −2 ). Notice that the allocation (xδM −2 , pM −2 (η)) approaches (xM −2 , pM −2 ) as η ↓ 0.
Therefore, offering pM −2 (η) at every n ≥ 0 is strictly dominated by following the equilibrium
strategy.
n
o
−1,M −2
Finally, let us contemplate the deviation to some offer p ∈ v(t̄M −2 ), pM
in the first
0

period. Assume that type t seller deviates by pooling with types t ∈ TM −1 ∪ TM until period
n ≤ n∗ .
First, assume that n = n∗ . At time n∗ + 1 one of the following 4 options is a best-response
for type t : i) Offer v(t1 ) in every n ≥ n∗ + 1 with the buyer accepting this offer with constant
probability 1 in each future period; ii) Offer v(t̄M −2 ) in every n ≥ n∗ + 1 with the buyer accepting
δ

this offer with constant probability ψ̄ M −2 in each future period; iii) Offer v(TM −1 ) in every
n ≥ n∗ + 1 with the buyer accepting this offer with constant probability ψ δM −1 in each future
period; iv) Offer v(TM ) in every n ≥ n∗ + 1 with the buyer accepting this offer with constant
probability ψ δM in each future period. By construction type t̄M −1 is indifferent between iii) and
iv), hence by single-crossing type t̄M −2 prefers iii) to iv). By construction type t̄M −2 is indifferent
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between iii) and ii). Furthermore, since xM −2 (pM −2 − c(t̄M −2 )) ≥ (v(t1 ) − c(t̄M −2 )) (because we
have a regular allocation) we conclude that option ii) is a best-response to type t̄M −2 . Thus, from
single-crossing any best-response for type t is either i) or ii).
Next, let us analyze the incentives of type t at period n∗ . Consider the fictional environment
in which the possibilities of type t are enriched at period n∗ : He has options i), ii) (above) and
−1,M −2
v): Offer pM
in every period n ≥ n∗ with the buyer accepting this offer with constant
n∗

probability ψ δn∗ in each future period. Type t̄M −2 is indifferent between ii) and v) and hence
type t would never choose v) at n∗ . Thus we conclude that type t would never pool with types
t ∈ TM −1 ∪ TM until period n∗ . The (essentially) same argument implies that type t would never
pool with types t ∈ TM −1 ∪ TM until period n = n∗ − 1.
By induction, we conclude that type t never pool with types TM −1 ∪ TM and hence he has

a best-response in which he offers p ∈ p1 , . . . , pM −2 (η) , v(t̄M −2 ) in every n ≥ 0. However,

type t̄M −2 is indifferent between offering pM −2 (η) , v(t̄M −2) in every n ≥ 0. Thus, from singlecrossing we conclude that type t has a best-response in the set {p1 , . . . , pM −2 (η)} . Therefore, from

the analysis in the previous two paragraphs we conclude that type t does not have a profitable
deviation.
One can use an analogous argument to show that no type t > t̄M −2 has a profitable deviation.
Finally, we specify the seller’s strategy after a deviation to an offer which is made on the
equilibrium path. We consider a type t < t̄M −2 . A similar construction holds for every type
t ≥ t̄M −2 (omited for brevity). First, assume that type t ∈ Tk has deviated in every period n ≤ ñ

and offered p ∈ p1 , . . . , pM −2 (η) , v(t̄M −2 ) and let ψ δ (p) the (constant) probability that the

buyer accepts this offer is each future period. The best-response of the seller depends on the
argmax of
A :=



ψ δ (p)
1 − δ(1 − ψ δ (p))





(p − c(t)) , (v(t1 ) − c(t)) , 0 .

If 0 ∈ arg max A then the seller offers v(tM ) + 1 in every future period. Otherwise, if
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ψδ (p)
1−δ(1−ψ δ (p))



(p − c(t)) ∈ arg max A the seller offers p in each future period.

Finally, if (v(t1 ) − c(t)) = arg max A, the seller offers v(t1 ) in each future period.

−1,M −2
Next, assume that type t has offered pM
in every period n ≤ ñ (ñ ≤ n∗ ). We have to
n




δ
δ
ψ̄ M −2
ψ̄ M −2
compare
(v(t̄M −2 ) − c(t)) and (v(t1 ) − c(t)) . If
(v(t̄M −2 ) − c(t)) ≥
δ
δ
1−δ(1−ψ̄ M −2 )
1−δ(1−ψ̄ M −2 )


δ
ψ̄ M −2
(v(t̄M −2 ) − c(t)) < (v(t1 ) − c(t))) the seller offers v(t̄M −2 )
(v(t1 ) − c(t)) (resp.
δ
1−δ(1−ψ̄ M −2 )

(resp. v(t1 )) in every future period.

−1,M −2
Now, assume that type t has offered pM
in every period n ≤ n∗ . and offered p ∈
n

 M −2
v(t̄
), v(TM −1 ), v(TM ) in every period n ∈ {n∗ + 1, . . . , n∗ + k}. Let ψ δ (p) be the (constant)

probability that the buyer accepts the offer p in each period. As above, hen the seller’s offer in
every future period is determined by the maximizer of A.
−1,M −2
The case in which the seller has offered pM
in every period n ≤ ñ (ñ ≤ n∗ ) and has
n

offered v(t̄M −2 ) in every period n ∈ {ñ + 1, . . . , ñ + k} is clearly analogous to the cases above
(omitted for brevity).
(7) Now we establish that the strategies are Markovian.
Let
−1,M −2
−1,M −2
P :={p1 , . . . , pM −3 , pM −2 (η) , v(t̄M −2), pM
, . . . , pM
, v(TM −1 ), v(TM )}
n∗
0

be the set of on-path offers (assume that pM −2 (η) 6= v(t̄M −2 ), otherwise eliminate v(t̄M −2 ) from
P).
Notice that in the equilibrium that we constructed, the behavioral strategy of type t at a
history h depends on which partition the history h belongs to.
i) Partition 1: h = ∅, the initial history;
ii) Partition p (p ∈ P, thus there are |P | of such partitions): h 6= ∅ and “no deviation” has
been detected by the buyer. In this case, the behavioral strategy of the type t seller depends
only on the offer p that was made in the last period.
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iii) Partition D : The buyer detected a deviation in h. (Remember that in this case the offer
made by type t is determined by arg max {(v(t1 ) − c(t)) , 0} .)
Notice that the history i) is associated to the initial belief q0 ∈ ∆ (T ). Notice also that if
the buyer has not detected any deviation then each offer p ∈ P made in the last period leads to
a different posterior which we call q(p). Finally, notice that if an offer belongs to the partition
D then the buyer puts a probability 1 on the seller being type t1 . We write q ({t1 }) for this
posterior.35 Therefore, the seller’s strategy depends only on the prior q (q ∈ {q ({t1 }) , q0 } ∪
{q(p) : p ∈ P}).
Finally, since the buyer’s behavioral strategy precludes that he accepts any on-path p ∈ P
with probability ψ δ (p) and accepts any off-path offer if and only if it is no greater than v(t1 ) we
conclude that the buyer plays a Markovian strategy.
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We remark that if T1 = {t1 } then the partitions D and p1 (notice that in this case p1 = v(t1 )) are the same.
This causes no difficulty.
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